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FINDING BETTER WORDS: MARKETS, PROPERTY
RIGHTS, AND RESOURCES
Andrew P. Morriss,* Roger Meiners,** and Bruce Yandle***
11 WASH. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 245 (2021)
ABSTRACT
To use or conserve environmental and natural resources
effectively is complex. Many economists believe that institutional
solutions built around markets and property rights can help
improve results. This approach addresses what Peruvian economist
Hernando de Soto termed the “missing lessons of U.S. history”—
institutions whose designers may not have understood the
outcomes that would occur, but the results were generally
beneficial. However, technical economic analysis generally fails to
persuade many at the policy level. Adding a focus on the
practicality of solving issues by voluntary action will enrich the
policy discussions. To do so requires economists to provide
concrete examples of how to resolve environmental issues.
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In this Article, we contrast the narratives given to support
markets and property rights and state-centered solutions. The
analysis suggests how to frame issues to increase opportunities for
market and property rights solutions to be more broadly
considered. In short, economists must stop talking past the
dedicated environmentalists who have learned to communicate
effectively with the public but often lack cost-effective alternatives
to address environmental problems that economists can provide.
Better narratives allow economists to join the public conversation
successfully.
INTRODUCTION
People concerned with solving environmental and natural resource
problems often talk past each other. They use different discourses to
describe problems and solutions. On the one hand, many passionate
advocates for state-centric solutions to these problems invoke a
combination of rights-based, scientific, and quasi-religious discourses to
support a call for increased national and international regulatory action. On
the other hand, passionate academic advocates for private property-rights
solutions to those same problems respond in the language of law-andeconomics, while land-owners objecting to regulation rest their arguments
on property rights claims. All point to bits of the other’s discourse from
time to time. State-centric environmentalists point to the discovery of
environmental externalities and demand Pigovian taxes and other
mandatory controls to address the problems. On the other side, free market
environmentalists invoke science and drift into their own discourse built
around ‘economic religion’ and land-owners focus on individual rights
claims. And, of course, many fall along a spectrum, resorting to one
discourse at times and to others at other times.
The late Robert Nelson aptly captured these battling religious
discourses in The New Holy Wars: Economic Religion vs. Environmental
Religion in Contemporary America,1 largely annoying both groups rather
than provoking the dialogue he aspired to create. When there are competing
narratives, a political struggle may ensue over which narrative will form
the basis for resource policy. A richer set of such narratives increases the
chances for effective solutions to important policy problems. While our
focus is on environmental issues, the macroeconomics economist Robert
1

ROBERT H. NELSON, THE NEW HOLY WARS: ECONOMIC RELIGION VS. ENVIRONMENTAL
RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (2010).
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Shiller recently developed a sub-chapter in economics called “narrative
economics” in which he seeks to formalize the study of narratives that we
believe affect social ordering.2 Among other goals, Shiller seeks to explain
how some narratives can become dominant. What might explain the rise of
dominant narratives is a central question that motivated our efforts.
This Article explores how market economists can better engage in
environmental policy debates.3 A change is needed, we believe, because
environmental policy is stagnant. The major environmental statutes, which
in some cases are 50 years old in fundamental features, are out of date.
There appears to be little chance that a gridlocked Congress will bring them
up to date. Debate is shrill and unproductive.
Analysis of resource issues will benefit from a structure that forces
analysts to work through key steps so major issues are seriously
considered. This can be done in a narrative manner rather than the formal
mathematical approach common among economists, who thereby lose
interest of those not members of the profession, as we explain later. Key
steps to be considered in resource analysis include:
1. Identification of the resource that requires investment in
discovery or development.
2. Identification of the parties who have a legal claim to determine
use of the resource.
3. Determination of resource use for exploitation in combination
with other resources or allocation of capital to assist in preservation
of the resource in a desired state.
4. Clearing the legal hurdles necessary to execute a development or
conservation plan.
5. Dealing with competitive use ideas under alternative institutional
regimes for the resource after it has been identified and come to
general knowledge.
2

ROBERT J. SHILLER, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, NARRATIVE ECONOMICS:
WORKING PAPER 23075 3 (2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23075.pdf (This was
Shiller’s presidential address to the 2017 American Economic Association meeting, in
which he defines the approach as follows: “By narrative economics I mean the study of the
spread and dynamics of popular narratives, the stories, particularly those of human interest
and emotion, and how these change through time, to understand economic fluctuations.”
Shiller expanded on the topic in his book NARRATIVE ECONOMICS: HOW STORIES GO VIRAL
& DRIVE MAJOR ECONOMIC EVENTS (2019).
3
There is considerable diversity within this group on different issues. For example, there is
an ongoing debate on the appropriateness of carbon taxes as a means of addressing climate
change. A carbon tax is more market-like than a non-transferable permitting scheme but still
involves a considerable degree of government decision-making (e.g. setting the level of the
tax).
247
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6. Effective investment in the resource for its highest valued use as
determined by participants in the institutional process.
Open dialogue as the process of evaluation proceeds, in a manner
accessible to interested parties, allows a richer understanding of the value
of the resource from alternative perspectives and increases the likelihood
that resources will be used in their most valued condition. How this process
can evolve is illustrated in Prof. Charlotte Epstein’s insightful book The
Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling
Discourse,4 which examines how whales went from the killer Moby Dick
to “sea pandas” and so transformed policies on whaling. (To some extent,
white tail deer have made a journey in the opposite direction, from Bambi
to “garden terrorists” and spreaders of Lyme disease.) Epstein argues that
the change came from a “powerful discourse” about whales, defining
“discourse” as “a cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations
about a specific object that frame that object in a certain way and,
therefore, delimit the possibilities for action in relation to it. “It is a
structured yet open and dynamic entity” and a “powerful discourse” as
“one that makes a difference.”5 We apply a similar methodology to
consider how changing the economic discourse about the environment
could open more room for dialogue to help break the logjam in
environmental policy.6
In the first section, we examine the narratives about environmental and
natural resource problems (which we refer to as “resource problems” to
avoid repeating the longer phrase). In the second section, we identify the
core resource problems and the issues the markets and property-rights
narrative have with addressing each. The third section explores marketbased and property-rights solutions to those problems and suggests how a
more convincing account might be constructed. Examples from the
nineteenth century American West fit into these conversations and shift the
narratives towards decentralized, property-rights based solutions. Finally,
4

CHARLOTTE EPSTEIN, THE POWER OF WORDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BIRTH OF AN
ANTI-WHALING DISCOURSE (2008).
5
Id. at 2.
6
Environmental law professors launched an effort to find common ground on environmental
policy that led to their book, DAVID SCHONBROD, RICHARD STEWART, & KATRINA WYMAN,
BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THAT WILL WORK (2010) (focusing
on how environmental legislation in the United Status has long been stuck and advocating
for nonpartisan public understanding to break this stalemate). The logjam proved largely
resistant to their best efforts. Of course, the logjam is partly due to the institutional structure
of government–the American system deliberately makes it hard to pass legislation–but our
argument is that institutional barriers are more likely to be overcome when there is a
common discourse than when there is not.
248
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2021

5

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 5

Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

we conclude with suggestions for how to engage using better narratives.
I.

CONTRASTING NARRATIVES

History is written primarily by the victors. After the Lakota7 had been
driven from what we now call the Dakotas, Wyoming and Montana,
immigrants vied for control of the land. There are two contrasting accounts
of the evolution of resource rights in the nineteenth century American west.
Most common is a tale of over-exploitation of resources by denizens of the
“wild, wild West.” Cattle and sheep men overgrazed the land, land
squatters claimed more water than was available, timber barons decimated
old-growth forests, and mining companies looted the nation’s natural
wealth.8 In their wake, they left a despoiled landscape.9 Only the heroic
intervention of the government, usually federal, prevented further
devastation.10 The other, less common, story is of institutional evolution to
solve conflicting claims to resources without violence using decentralized
means. This story of “The Not So Wild, Wild West” is the centerpiece of
Terry Anderson and P.J. Hill’s landmark account of the evolution of
western property rights solutions to commons problems on the frontier.11
This story is less susceptible to Hollywood-style treatment of sensitive

7

For an overview of the scope of Lakota (the name given to multiple tribes that were
loosely confederated) control, at the expense of other tribes, see PEKKA HAMALAINEN,
LAKOTA AMERICA: A NEW HISTORY IN INDIGENOUS POWER (2019). Hamalainen explains that
Lakota control of the area existed for less than 200 years as existing tribes were pushed
further south and west. Quasi-nomadic Lakota notions of property were not concerned with
metes and bounds so much as access to valuable goods, such as buffalo, during hunting
season.
8
GEORGE WUERTHNER & MOLLIE MATTESON, WELFARE RANCHING: THE SUBSIDIZED
DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN WEST (2002) (discussing overgrazing); JOHN FLECK,
WATER IS FOR FIGHTING OVER (2016) (discussing water issues); DAVID OWEN, WHERE THE
WATER GOES: LIFE AND DEATH ALONG THE COLORADO RIVER (2017) (discussing water
issues); GORDON G. WHITNEY, FROM COSTAL WILDERNESS TO FRUITED PLAIN (1994)
(discussing logging); DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER OF OUR
COMMON WEALTH (2003) (discussing mining).
9
Environmentalists often suggest this occurs widely. See, e.g., BART JOHNSON & KRISTINA
HILL, ECOLOGY AND DESIGN 174 (2002) (“Our most ubiquitous model of development really
does represent a despoiled landscape . . . .”).
10
Theodore Roosevelt is often credited for saving much of the west. See, e.g., DOUGLAS
BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE CRUSADE FOR
AMERICA (2009); BARB ROSENSTOCK, THE CAMPING TRIP THAT CHANGED AMERICA:
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JOHN MUIR, AND OUR NATIONAL PARKS (2012). This narrative is
common in modern fiction about the development of the west.
11
TERRY L. ANDERSON & P.J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON
THE FRONTIER (2004).
249
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preservationists and noble politicians protecting resources from
despoliation, so it runs counter to popular notions of western history.
Shane, one of the few westerns to offer more than a single point of
view of the conflicts over resources in the nineteenth century American
west, captures the conflicting narratives.12 The movie revolves around the
role of a wandering gunman, Shane, who stops at the Wyoming territory
homestead of Joe and Marian Sterret. He becomes involved in the dispute
between the homesteaders fencing the land and the cattlemen, led by Rufus
Ryker, who want open range grazing. In the key scene, Ryker offers to buy
the Sterrets out of their homestead, to hire Joe, and to allow the Sterrets to
run their cattle with his. (Ryker is in essence offering a Coasian bargain.)
He reasons that if he deprives the homesteaders of their leader he can
eliminate the conflict between their fences and his cattle. When Ryker
refuses to agree to make similar offers to the other homesteaders, Sterret
challenges Ryker’s right to the range.
Here we see the core of both narratives. Ryker’s claim arises from selfhelp and extra-legal behavior. Sterret insists that only rights recognized by
the government count, thereby telling the common story about the origin of
rights and the appropriate means of resolving conflicts. Ryker’s assertion
that “we made this country” tells a different story, resting on both a
Lockean claim13 derived from people mixing their labor with the land and
an understanding of rights that excluded other parties whose claims might
have predated theirs (non-ranchers, Native Americans) but did not involve
much mixing of labor with the land. Behind both men loom Shane and
Wilson, whose conflict represents the role of force in establishing rights.
12
13

SHANE (Paramount Pictures 1953).
In section 27 of his treatise Locke argues:
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet
every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right
to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we
may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state
that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with,
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath
placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes
the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable
property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is
once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in
common for others.

JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 5.27 (1690). See also David
Schmidtz, The Institution of Property, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 42 (1994)
(exploring the Lockean notion of property rights).
250
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Because it is a Hollywood western, the outcome is that the virtuous
violence, embodied by Shane, triumphs over the evil violence, embodied
by Wilson. Nobody bothers to get a lawyer and head to court.
Shane captures a key dimension of the underlying conflict over
resources in the American West and can inform debates over resources
today. Ryker is a villain, responsible for bringing violence into the
community by hiring Wilson and setting off the events that leads to the
climactic gun battle. If Shane is the narrative, evolving property rights
solutions have lost the day before the discussion has begun.
Similarly, Ivan Doig’s 1996 novel of two Scottish immigrants who
become sheep ranchers brings in the federal government as the savior of
the range.14 Angus McCaskill, the narrator, comes to accept the need for
federal supervision in the person of forest ranger Stanley Meixell; his
former partner, Rob Barclay, does not. Doig uses the differing reactions of
his two central characters, both of whom have become successful Montana
sheep ranchers, to the arrival of a wise forest ranger, Stanley Meixell,
bringing word of the creation of the national forests to provide the final
moral to his story. When narrator and hero Angus Alexander McCaskill
first meets Meixell on the mountain and learns of the idea of a national
forest that will cover some of the range he grazes his sheep on, Meixell
reassures him that the creation of the forest need not end sheep ranching.
Angus then asks:
“But then, if we can still use the range, why bother to – Mr. Meixell,
just what in holy hell do you and President Teddy have in mind for us?”
“The idea ain’t to keep the range from being used,” Meixell said as if it
was a catechism. “It’s to keep it from being used to death.”15
Such narratives go beyond being bits of popular culture. They shape
how people think about institutions.16 As economist Deirdre McCloskey
argues, “persuasive knowledge is social.”17 As economists, we need to
think about how the narratives we offer in public debate are heard by our
audience. If we wish to be persuasive, we must examine our “language in
action and converse more politely with others in the conversations of
humanity.”18 Unfortunately, much economic rhetoric in resource debates
14

IVAN DOIG, DANCING AT THE RASCAL FAIR (1996).
Id. at 230-231.
16
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 13-14 (“Whaling was normal until the mid 1960s. The
new anti-whaling discourse displaced the norm, such that it became ‘unacceptable,’ even
‘barbaric.’ Normality is thus relative and discoursively ordained.”)
17
DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS 61 (2nd ed., 1998).
18
Id. at 167.
15

251
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comes close to Prof. C. Steven Bradford’s brilliant parody of legal
academic writing, As I Lay Writing, which includes a prisoner’s dilemma
diagram with the comment “Once you've created a prisoner's dilemma, you
can forget about it. You've justified whatever type of regulation you want
to propose, and economics is no longer a problem.”19 While Bradford was
writing satire, we think economics is more than a cut-and-paste justification
for a regulatory intervention or avoiding one, but all too often is invoked as
just that.
Expanding public discourse to include market and property rights
solutions for resource problems is important for reasons beyond making
practitioners of the “dismal science” actually be more valuable in public
discourse.20 The evolution of public policy in many environmental areas
has been stalled for decades and new perspectives might offer ways to
“break the logjam.”21 The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) needs revision
to reflect better the role of habitat in species protection so as to discourage
perverse incentives to destroy habitat to forestall restrictions on otherwise
legal property use under the law; 22 national parks, while often termed
19

C. Steven Bradford, As I Lay Writing: How to Write Law Review Articles for Fun and
Profit: A Law-and- Economics, Critical, Hermeneutical, Policy Approach and Lots of Other
Stuff That Thousands of Readers Will Find Really Interesting and Therefore You Ought to
Publish in Your Prestigious, Top-Ten, Totally Excellent Law Review, 44 J. LEG. EDUC. 13,
22 (1994).
20
As long-time practicing economists, we can attest that economists often are self-assured
their objective science is superior to other fields held in disdain. The public is often assumed
to be beyond the pale of comprehending important matters.
21
Schonbrod et al., supra, note 8. “Breaking the Logjam” was a multi-year project at the
New York Law School and New York University School of Law that focused on problems
with outdated environmental statutes and noted the political forces that worked to derail
efforts at reform. See Carol A. Casazza Herman, David Schoenbrod, Richard B. Stewart, &
Katrina M. Wyman, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress
and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENV’T L. J. 1 (2008). William Reilly, EPA administrator
from 1989 to 1993, noted that administrations leave “ticking hand grenades” for the next
administration—one after another for decades. David Schoenbrod, How REINS Would
Improve Environmental Protection, 21 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 347, 348 (2011).
22
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973). Habitat
destruction spurred by the Act is explained in Dean Lueck and Jeffrey Michael, Preemptive
Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act, 42 J. L. & ECON. 27 (2003). On the
issues involving species protection that are now better understood than decades ago, See,
e.g., Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 175, 234 (2010) (“For the ESA to effectively serve our conservation
goals, it must adopt a more realistic view that accounts for nature’s dynamic qualities and
avoids freezing legal obligations.”). The Act is currently under again consideration for
revision. For how revisions could help. John G. Slide & David B. Bowman, Habitat
Protection Under the Endangered Species Act, 2 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 116 (1988). (“the
major cause of extinctions has been the destruction of natural habitat.”) See also, Tate
Watkins, Changing the Endangered Species Act Could Actually Help Conservation,
252
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treasures, are not properly maintained;23 the General Mining Law needs to
be updated to reflect changes in technology and knowledge;24 the Clean Air
Act has not been updated since 1990;25 the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act’s last major update was in 1987;26 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
WASHINGTON POST (Jul. 24, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/07/24/changing-theendangered-species-act-could-actually-help-conservation/.
23
Yellowstone and Yosemite are hailed as sacred places. See, e.g., NPR, Yellowstone:
Evolution of a National Treasure (2008), https://www.npr.org/series/94333829/yellowstoneevolution-of-a-national-treasure. Despite this, they are grossly mismanaged due to
Congressional funding decisions that ignore maintenance needs. See, e.g., Restore Our
Parks Act of 2018: Hearing on S. 3172 Before the S. Energy and Natural Resources Comm.,
115th Cong. (2018) (testimony of Holly Fretwell, Outreach Director and Research Fellow,
Property and Environmental Research Center),
https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=80E9D20E-A569468C-AF6F-6772692AF3AA.
24
The General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 22, has been amended over the years but
not significantly revised. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1744 provides the basis for a wide range of administrative controls that can affect mining
claims. See, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 AS AMENDED (2016),
https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/AboutUs_LawsandRegs_FLPMA.pdf (overview).
This means shifting regulatory standards based on the administration of the day rather than
clear statutory standards. While we think the 1872 statute has much merit, most
commentators are critical of it as outdated Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners, & Andrew
Dorchak, Between a Hard Rock and a Hard Place: Politics, Midnight Regulations and
Mining, 55 55 ADMIN L. REV. 551 (2003); MINERAL POLICY CTR., THE LAST AMERICAN
DINOSAUR . . . THE 1872 MINING LAW (2000),
https://www.earthworks.org/publications/the_last_american_dinosaur_the_1872_mining_la
w/.
25
The modern Clean Air Act dates to 1970 (42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.). Its last major revision
was in 1990. See, EPA, Summary of the Clean Air Act (2020), https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/summary-clean-air-act, the addition of first chemical to be added to the original
list of 189 hazardous air pollutants in the 1990 Amendment was approved. See See, EPA,
Petitions to Add 1-BP (nPB) to the Clean Air Act List of Hazardous Air Pollutants (2020),
https://www.epa.gov/haps/petitions-add-1-bp-npb-clean-air-act-list-hazardous-airpollutants. Calls for major reforms are continual, now often focusing on climate change.
See, Ann E. Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hotspot Pollution,
65 UCLA L. REV. 1036 (2018); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Preemption and Commandeering
Without Congress, 70 STAN. L. REV. 2031 (2018).
26
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.) was subject to
major revision in 1972, producing what is commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act;
See EPA, History of the Clean Water Act, (2020), https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/history-clean-water-act. Other than changes in the structure of federal subsidies
for sewer and water treatment plants, dealing with Great Lakes agreements with Canada,
storm sewers, via the Water Quality Act of 1987 (Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.), the statute has not had substantive revisions.
The basic structure of the Act provides perverse incentives and injures the ability of various
regions to handle their unique needs; See, Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, & Roger E.
253
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and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) has been overhauled just three times since
1970;27 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) passed in
1976 to deal with municipal and industrial waste was amended in 1984 to
limit hazardous waste disposal, in 1992 to include federal facilities, and in
1996 to provide greater regulatory flexibility for disposal of certain wastes
but has not had a major update since then;28 the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA) of 1976 addresses “the production, importation, use, and
disposal of specific chemicals” and was last amended in 2016, in a fashion
that disappointed many environmentalists.29 And, notably, despite years of
Meiners, The Failure of EPA’s Water Quality Reforms: From Environment-Enhancing
Competition to Uniformity and Polluter Profits, 20 UCLA J. ENV’T L & POL’Y 25 (2001). As
is well known, the statute intentionally ignores many of the problems caused by agricultural
runoff. See, e.g., Eric M. Dirth, Successful Agriculture and Clean Water? A Workable Path
Forward for Regulating Drainage Districts as Point Sources Under the Clean Water Act,
103 IOWA L. REV. 1213 (2018). It also fails to address other substantive water issues. See,
e.g., See, e.g., David A. Strifling, Reducing Chloride Discharges to Surface Water and
Groundwater: A Menu of Options for Policymakers, 48 ENV’T L. 167 (2018); A. Dan
Tarlock, Western Water Law and the Challenge of Climate Disruption, 48 ENV’T L. 1
(2018); Damien Schiff, Keeping the Clean Water Act Cooperatively Federal – Or, Why the
Clean Water Act Does Not Directly Regulate Groundwater Pollution, 42 WM. & MARY
ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 477 (2018).
27
FIFRA, as commonly known, arose out of the Federal Insecticide Act of 1910, which
evolved into the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act in 1947 (7 U.S.C. §§
136-136y), which was amended by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of
1972, and was again amended by the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, and the Pesticide
Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2012. While it is lumped with the
environmental statutes, its focus is on registration of products and product labeling.
28
EPA, History of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (2020),
https://www.epa.gov/rcra/history-resource-conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra. Some
commentators have suggested extreme adaptations for the statute, e.g., Note, RCRA as a
Tool for Environmental Justice Communities and Others to Compel Climate Change
Adaptation, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2409 (2018), but this is likely illusory. More practical
matters, such as coal ash disposal, have yet to be firmly resolved under the statute. See,
Carol J. Miller, For a Lump of Coal & a Drop of Oil: An Environmentalist’s Critique of the
Trump Administration’s First Year of Energy Policies, 36 VA. ENV’T L. J. 185, 227-230
(2018) (discussion of how ash treatment flipped between the Obama and Trump
administrations).
29
EPA, Summary of the Toxic Substances Control Act (2020), https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/summary-toxic-substances-control-act; the 2016 amendment is the Frank R.
Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act. As might be expected of a statute
directed at the chemical industry that was sponsored by a senator from a state with
significant chemical production facilities, the amendments have been derided as a failure by
the Obama administration to deal with major shortcomings in the original statute. See, e.g.,
Kalyn Behnke, Toxic Preemption: Why the Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act’s Erosion of
State Authority Contaminates Environmental Law, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 459 (2017) and Sanne
H. Knudsen, Regulating Cumulative Risk, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2316 (2017) (“That Act,
like its predecessor, is largely silent on how and whether to integrate concerns about
cumulative risk into the new framework.”).
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shrill talk about near infinite costs to be imposed by climate change, no
substantive legislation has been enacted. In short, major environmental
statutes enacted during the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations have not
been subject to substantive overhauls despite advances in scientific
knowledge and general agreement about some of the shortcomings of the
statutory and subsequent administrative regimes.30 We think this is at least
partly because the narratives of environmental law are outdated.
Proponents and opponents of changes to these statutes have exhausted
themselves in zero-sum battles over their favored ideas for improving them
because they have been talking past each other, using different discourses.31
Moreover, many of the issues we face today are not readily resolved by
appeals to science. As Epstein notes, “the whaling case has shown that
when political differences run deep, science does not have the power to
provide a rational basis for the development of a common understanding,
and from there, of successful collective policies.”32 Further, she concludes:
[S]cience cannot overwrite a fully entrenched dominant discourse.
When its conclusions run counter to the expectations inscribed in a
dominant discourse, they are simply overlooked. Thus in the pro1964 whaling order, despite the creation of an international regime
that conferred a key role upon science, scientists could not tell
whaling policy makers what they did not want to hear—that some
whales were rapidly disappearing. Conversely in the anti-whaling
order, scientists could no longer tell (a majority of) anti-whaling
policy makers what they did not want to hear, namely, that certain
stocks of whales might not be so endangered. For the implication is
that they could sustain some measure of controlled exploitation, a
possibility that is simply precluded by the anti-whaling discourse.
30

Environmental law scholars have been noting this for some time, see, Richard B. Stewart,
A New Generation of Environmental Regulation? 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 182 (2001) (“The
command regulatory status quo is coming under increasingly severe pressure because of its
inherent inability to meet demands for maintaining or improving environmental quality at
acceptable economic and social cost.”). Of course, the regulations issued under these
statutes have been updated from time to time, but this is not sufficient to address the
structural problems caused by mistakes in theory (ESA), bad design (Superfund), failure to
address major issues (Clean Air Act), and so on.
31
Stasis has multiple causes and we are addressing only one here. For example, existing
regulatory regimes give some participants advantages, which then encourages them to
maintain the status quo, sometimes forming “bootleggers and Baptists” coalitions to do so.
See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists – The Education of a Regulatory Economist,
May/June 1983, 12; ADAM SMITH & BRUCE YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS AND BAPTISTS: HOW
ECONOMIC FORCES AND MORAL PERSUASION INTERACT TO SHAPE REGULATORY POLITICS
(2014).
32
Epstein, supra note 4, at 136.
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In fact, the anti-whaling discourse does more than foreground the
scientific question of whales’ endangeredness. It answers that
question in the affirmative. A key articulatory practice of the antiwhaling discourse is not only to associate any evocation of the
whales with the powerful notion of their endangeredness … but it
is to provide the automatic answer to the underlying question, such
that they are assumed to be endangered prior to the question of
having actually been asked. Thus a key articulatory effect of that
discourse is that it forecloses the scientific question of their
endangeredness from the onset.33
In an era of global populism, believing that Congress will thoughtfully
address environmental issues is a less credible narrative today than when
the major environmental laws were passed. Resource issues are more
difficult than in 1970. Many clean air debates are now about marginal
improvements rather than control of “killer smogs.”34 Clean water debates
are no longer about burning rivers but about less visible, and far trickier,
problems such as non-point sources.35 Pesticide debates are no longer
driven by the emotional narrative of Silent Spring but combine public
health issues with complex pesticide-environment interactions.36 Hazardous
33

Epstein, supra note 4, at 136-137.
See, e.g., INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF THE WAR ON AIR
POLLUTION (1999); Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM: BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 263 (Terry Anderson, ed., 2000). A
recent air pollution issue surrounds Volkswagen (and others) use of sophisticated engine
controllers in diesel cars to “defeat” air pollution controls, resulting in higher particulate and
NOX emissions that regulators expected. See, Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal
Explained, BBC News (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772.
While quite serious, these violations required sophisticated testing to detect rather than the
visual evidence provided in the “killer smogs” of the 1950s. Moreover, crucial terms,
including “the environment” remain poorly defined. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 102
(“it was not clear what exactly ‘the environment’ was, beyond ‘that thing’ that was being
threatened by human activity. In this sense it was a signifier still waiting to be settled.”).
35
See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of
Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENV’T L. J. 89 (2002); Roger Meiners, Stacie
Thomas, & Bruce Yandle, Burning Rivers, Common Law, and Institutional Choice for
Water Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 54-85 (Roger E. Meiners &
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 1999). On the problems of non-point source pollution within a
traditional water pollution framework, See, e.g., Domenico Siniscalco, Foreward to
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION REGULATION: ISSUES AND ANALYSIS, at vii (Cesare Dosi &
Theodore Tomasi eds., 1994) (noting the difficulty in adapting the traditional point source
regulatory tool kit to the specific features of nonpoint source problems”).
36
See, e.g., G.M. Gray & J.K. Hammitt, Risk/risk Trade-Offs in Pesticide Regulation: An
Exploratory Analysis of the Public Health Effects of a Ban on Organophosphate and
Carbamate Pesticides, 20 RISK ANAL. 665 (2000). For an overview of Rachel Carson’s
environmental masterpiece in the perspective of modern science and evidence, See, SILENT
34

256
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2021

13

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 5

Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

waste is an issue no longer defined by Love Canal but by innovation in
converting wastes into new products.37 Yet, each of these statutes is built
around the notion that command-and-control technology-based standards,
rather than performance standards or use of economic incentives, is the
most effective way to address the central environmental problem. The same
issues arise now with respect to the discussion about how to address
climate change and carbon emissions. After decades of experience, we
have learned that command-and-control—typically with a one-size-fits-all
solution—is usually not the most cost effective way to provide
environmental protection. At the very least, a system of waivers should be
introduced so that demonstrably superior resource protection approaches
can be applied. Command-and-control became the dominant narrative in
the 1970s, but we can do better now. If the lessons of law and economics,
from contracting and the role of property rights, are to contribute more to
environmental progress than a cut-and-paste prisoner’s dilemma diagram,
those who, like us, favor such approaches need to find better ways of
talking about them.
Property and market solutions are particularly useful for improvements
in environmental quality. Those achieved thus far mean the issues are no
longer about whether to protect the environment but about tradeoffs
required by choosing one method of doing so over another.38 Property
SPRING AT 50: THE FALSE CRISES OF RACHEL CARSON (Roger Meiners, Pierre Desrochers, &
Andrew Morriss eds., 2013).
37
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE FOUNDATION, ACHIEVING A CIRCULAR ECONOMY:
HOW THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS REIMAGINING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS (2015),
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Circular%20Economy%20Web.pdf
38
See, e.g., YVETTE TAMINIAU, ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE 217 (2001). Taminiau describes a
report on negotiations over the final report of a joint oil-auto program to develop
technological data to inform regulators in the EU which illustrates the tradeoffs between
emissions controls based on fuel changes and those based on engine changes:
[T]ensions arose between the two industries who were fighting hard to get the
most results favorable for their industry. It often was a win-lose situation where
improvements for the auto industry meant a loss for the oil industry and viceversa.... [The discussions] was also described as "physically, mentally and morally
very hard" and the competition between the two industries was compared to
European warfare.
See also Andrew P. Morriss, The Next Generation of Mobile Source Regulation, 17 N.Y.U.
ENV’T L. J. 325 (2008). Shortcomings of vehicle emission standards became ever more
apparent with the diesel emission scandal. See, Cary Conlianese & Jennifer Nash, The Law
of the Text: Performance-Based Regulations and Diesel Emissions Control, 34 YALE J. ON
REG. 33 (2017). See also, RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1995). As Cass R. Sunstein
notes in that volume, “If … government tries to protect human health by imposing fuel
economy requirements on cars, it may lead companies to produce smaller and less safe
cars…” Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, in RISK VERSUS RISK, supra, at viii.
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rights offer important institutions for incentivizing rights holders to
consider tradeoffs, and markets excel at resolving tradeoffs.39 Crucially,
property rights solutions can favor environmental values, such as when
anglers challenged pollution of English rivers or when individuals can
compete in EPA sulphur-dioxide emission permit auctions and purchase
and retire the right to pollute.40 Giving such tools a more prominent place
in the policy toolkit would create opportunities even for those not
concerned about the environment per se.41 Moreover, many environmental
and natural resource issues today arise in locations with weak governance
institutions.42 Many regulatory solutions place heavy demands on
governments.43 Putting such demands on weak governments is an unlikely
recipe for success. Developing strong public sector institutions, while
desirable, is a long, uncertain, and costly process.44 There will be times—
39

See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
115 (2004) (overview of the issues often raised about command and control versus property
rights). See also, Jonathan H. Adler, Water Rights, Markets, and Changing Ecological
Conditions, 42 ENV’T L. 93, 112 (2012) (“[M]arket institutions and private rights in natural
resources will be necessary to overcome the profound ecological challenges faced by
humanity today and those that will emerge in the future.”).
40
See Roger Bate, Saving Our Streams, 14 FORDHAM ENV’T L. J. 375 (2003) (Recounting
litigation efforts by fishermen in the U.K. to protect the rivers they fish in). The private
litigation saga in the U.K. that Bate recounts to stop polluters by suing them to protect fish,
because many people like to fish, has been so successful that litigation handled by the
Anglers’ Conservation Association is now partly overshadowed by organizing volunteers
who assist in stopping illegal fishing. See, Angling Trust, https://anglingtrust.net/ (follow
“Fish Legal” hyperlink); Also see, EPA, 2019 SO2 Allowance Auction (2020),
https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/2019-so2-allowance-auction.
41
Some of the tools have long been present and were commonly employed prior to the rise
of administrative environmental law. See, Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law
and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 923 (1999).
42
Environmental protection is generally lacking in developing countries. Michael Faure,
Morag Goodwin, & Franziska Weber, Bucking the Kuznets Curve: Designing Effective
Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries, 51 VA. J. INT’L. 95, 100-107 (2010).
Even if government is strong it can be ineffective in providing incentives to engage in
productive activity.
43
China has been noteworthy as a developing economy where the government is quite
aware of environmental degradation and has laws on the books to deal with pollution, but in
the past failed to enforce standards. See, Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable
Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 365,
367 (2013) (“Although China has constructed an expansive environmental law framework
over the past 30 years, implementation of laws and regulations in practice has been
notoriously weak.”). The effectiveness has recently improved. See Haitao Yin, Xuemei
Zhang, & Feng Wang, Environmental Regulations in China, in OXFORD RESEARCH
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE (2019). This can be interpreted as China’s
economic growth creating demand for improved environmental quality.
44
Even countries with huge resource bases, which should lead to higher standards of living
often fail to achieve that due to poor governance structures. See, e.g., Macartan Humphreys,
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when, for example, the transfer agent is a thief—that a market solution
built around transferable property rights merely provides the thieves a
lower cost means of theft. Where corruption exists or formal governance
matters little, non-governmental solutions built around family, tribal, clan,
or other social groupings, may be preferable.45
To persuade policymakers and citizens to consider markets and
property rights solutions requires a narrative that puts these solutions in a
context they can understand and make sense of as more than the result of a
partial equilibrium analysis or tables of regression results. The narrative
must be seen as a coherent, attractive explanation. To do that, we must
break resources problems down and consider how different institutional
solutions fit into the narratives.
II.

RESOURCE PROBLEMS

We define six problems posed by resources questions, using general
statements of the problems to focus attention on institutional structure
Natural Resources, Conflicts, and Conflict Resolution, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 508
(2005) (Drawing primarily from the experiences of Sahelian and West African states, this
article discusses the connection and effect of natural resources and conflicts ultimately
supporting the idea that a weak state is more impactful than any existence of rebel greed in
potential resource exploitation); James D. Fearon & David Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency and
Civil War, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75 (2003) (Reflecting upon countries’ experiencing civil
conflict after the end of the Cold War and argues these conflicts are occurring because of
factors such as poverty or rough terrain rather than religious or ideological differences).
Attempts by developed nations to deter bad behavior by firms and governments working
together to strip assets from a country, such as the Dodd-Frank Act’s conflict minerals
provisions, often fail miserably and can make conditions on the ground worse. Dominic P.
Parker, Jeremy D. Foltz, & David Elsea, Unintended Consequences of Sanctions for Human
Rights: Conflict Minerals and Infant Mortality, 59 J. L. & ECON. 731 (2016) (By analyzing
the effect of sanctions on countries experiencing a resource conflict, particularly the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, this article argues that sanctions against these countries
actually harm the innocent citizens of those countries that they are trying to protect);
Dominic P. Parker & Bryan Vadheim, Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed? U.S. Regulation
of Conflict Minerals and Violence in the Congo, 4 J. ASSN. ENV’T & RES. ECON. 1 (2017)
(This article discusses the unintended impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act on the Democratice
Republic of the Congo to highlight how it led to further harm on the country’s residents).
45
There are some narratives. Most notable are those by ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). Ostrom was
the first woman to be awarded the Nobel Prize (in 2009) “for her analysis of economic
governance, especially the commons.” See https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economicsciences/2009/ostrom/facts/. We recall that some economists were aghast at this award, not
only because she was not trained as an economist, but because her work was largely one of
narratives, not formal mathematical models and regression analysis. Her work at Indiana
University continues in the Ostrom Workshop, especially the Program on Natural Resource
Governance. See https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/research/governance/index.html
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rather than on minutiae of examples. By doing so, we intend to develop
narratives which may serve to broaden the discussion. These broadly
defined classes of problems span most resource issues:
(1) The resources must be identified. This can mean locating a
mineral deposit, realizing that a river has potential for trout fishing
that can attract anglers, or that a wetland provides ecological
services to migrating waterfowl. This is an incentivizing knowledge
problem: what is a resource? How can it be used? Where is it?
What are the alternative uses for it? Solving this requires a wide
range of knowledge of how to effect entrepreneurial vision in the
policy arena.
(2) Conflicting uses of resources are inevitable. Conflicts may be
between making use of different aspects of the resource (extracting
minerals, maintaining a trout stream or wetland) or between
making use of the resource now or later. Or among these, who gets
the right once the value has been recognized? This is a rights
recognition problem.
(3) If a resource is to be developed or left undeveloped, capital
often must be assembled to enable development or preservation.46
Investors need security that their assets will not be stolen or
confiscated. This is a rights security problem.
(4) Valuable resources in which ownership rights are less than
clear present corruption opportunities. How enforceable claims to
resources are allocated, how disputes over claims are resolved, and
who makes decisions about resource use are central to the degree
of corruption. This is a problem of providing effective public
institutions.
(5) Those holding resource claims may interfere with the rights of
others. How those conflicts are resolved will have important
impacts on resource decisions. This is a conflict resolution
problem.

46

Preserving resources is costly and requires sophisticated designs so donors believe their
contributions will be used as promised. The American Prairie Reserve is a good example of
a success in doing so, having raised tens of millions of dollars since 2001 to piece together
parcels of land in north-central Montana to create a protected habitat for bison and other
species. See, AMERICAN PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.americanprairie.org.
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(6) There is debate over whether resource endowments constitute a
“curse” for states in which the resources exist. The argument for
the curse points to destructive conflicts over control of resources
and economic distortions from the impact of the resource sector on
the remainder of the economy.47 Those who believe there is no
curse argue that these are symptoms of broader institutional
failings, not specific to resources.48 This is an external impact
problem.
In this section, we describe each of these problems and provide examples
against which we test institutions’ claims to be able to resolve the problems
in the following section.
A.

Incentivizing Knowledge: Creating New Information

The knowledge problem for resources encompasses where particular
resources are (is there oil under this piece of land?), the environmental
value (is this vital habitat?), the potential use value of the resource (is this a
spot where people will pay a premium to ski?), and the spiritual value (is
this a place held in reverence by some?). Before a resource can be
integrated into a market, it must be identified as a resource.49 This requires
people to know it exists and to know its potential value. This is true of both
a mineral deposit and a spectacular vista—in neither case does the resource
have value to people until someone has identified it.50 Value can shift as
technology and tastes change. California was once thought remote by the
47

When parties devote significant resources to political/corrupt fights over control of
resources, rather than devoting human and physical capital to build constructive economies,
there is a drag effect that reaches beyond the immediate scrap over who controls the
resources. This argument is most developed in Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, The Curse
of Natural Resources, 45 EURO. ECON. REV. 827 (2001). See also, Xavier Sala-I-Martin &
Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria,
22 J. AFR. ECON. 4 (2013) (similar result focused on oil); Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and
Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 232 (2004)
(same).
48
See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER,
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012); PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION (2007).
49
Here we focus on physical resources but recognize that the human mind is, as Julian
Simon popularized, the ultimate resource. See generally JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE
RESOURCE 2 (1998).
50
Of course, there is a vigorous debate over existence value and whether human valuation is
sufficient (or even necessary). As economists, we start with the value of resources to people
and leave the more esoteric claims to others. See, e.g., VALUING NATURE?: ECONOMICS,
ETHICS AND ENVIRONMENT (John Foster ed., 1997); Paul Milgrom, Is Sympathy an
Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics, and the Contingent Valuation Method, in
CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 417 (J. A. Hausman ed., 1993).
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European settlers in eastern America and, before the discovery of gold, not
very desirable, but property prices now suggest people see it as a highly
attractive place to live.51 As the cost of getting to California changed, and
as jurisdiction shifted from Mexico to the United States, more people found
it desirable.52 Legal regimes enable the values of mineral deposits and
agricultural land to become concrete. Oil seeps in Pennsylvania were
widely known before they were valuable as sources of energy; once
demand for petroleum grew, prospectors invested in improved methods of
exploiting petroleum deposits.53 More recently, the development of
fracking techniques turned low value gas and oil trapped in rock into high
value deposits.54

51

Santa Barbara, a highly desirable location today, was a tiny, stinking village in the 1830s
when its primary purpose was tanning cattle hides for export. RICHARD HENRY DANA,
Jr., TWO YEARS BEFORE THE MAST 92 (1840) (“everything being as still as death, the people
hardly seeming to earn their sunlight.”).
52
Dana’s son, Richard Henry Dana III, who revised the book in 1911, added a supplement
by his father which he wrote after he returned to California in 1859. Id. at 174-194. Then,
instead of there being only “Richardson’s shanty of 1835” he reported San Francisco to be
“the great center of a world-wide commerce” with “one hundred thousand inhabitants.” He
learned that the rise as a significant city had not been easy. Crime has been rampant until
suppressed by “the solemn, awe-inspiring Vigilance Committee of the most grave and
responsible citizens, the last resort of the thinking and the good, taken to only when vice,
fraud, and ruffianism have intrenched themselves behind the forms of law, suffrage, and
ballot, and there is no hope but in organized force.” Dana was no wild west man; he taught
law at Harvard and, in private practice in Boston, helped indigent sailors abused by their
employers and assisted fugitive slaves seeking freedom, as his son notes in his closing
remarks. Id. at 189.
53
Changing from small wells putting oil into wooden barrels to more efficient operations
was difficult. Many small operators could not compete with John D. Rockefeller, who
employed economies of scale in all phases of operations. Ida M. Tarbell portrayed this as
destructive in her which was a major “expose” of the anticompetitive practices of John D.
Rockefeller’s organization, predatory pricing (price cutting). IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY
OF STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904). Tarbell’s attack played a major role in influencing the
antitrust litigation against the company that began soon after her book appeared. (This led
to Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).) Daniel Yergin concluded that the
book was “the single most influential book on business ever published in the United States.”
DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE 105 (1991). More recent scholarship interprets the facts
differently, portraying Standard Oil as a victim of its success and concluding that “it is
prudent to be cautious whenever antitrust concerns are raised by competitors who are losing
the race for innovation.” Michael Reksulak & William F. Shughart II, Tarring the Trust:
The Political Economy of Standard Oil, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 23A, 32A (2012).
54
See, e.g., ERIC GEORGE & JACQUELINE GEORGE, FRACKING 101: A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (2016); BETHANY MCLEAN, SAUDI AMERICA: THE TRUTH ABOUT
FRACKING AND HOW IT’S CHANGING THE WORLD (2018); and DANIEL RAIMI, THE FRACKING
DEBATE: THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND UNCERTAINTIES OF THE SHALE REVOLUTION (2017).
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Tastes change too. Early advocates of wilderness preservation were—
almost literally—prophets in the wilderness, such as John Muir.55 As
Americans grew to value wild spaces, popular support for conservation
grew. More generally, considerable data suggests that there is an
“environmental Kuznets curve,” with demand for cleaner air and other
natural agents growing once a society reaches around $5,000 GDP per
capita for air, suggesting that greater wealth at some point increases
demand for environmental protection to the point that uncontrolled use of
air, water, and other agents becomes limited.56
Developing the knowledge necessary to evaluate a resource may
require considerable investment (e.g. mineral surveys) as well as
entrepreneurial insight (people will like to live here to appreciate the view
if there are sufficient amenities and it is expected we can protect the
views), technical knowledge (how to draft conservation easements, how to
separate valuable minerals from rock, the ecological value of a habitat), and
intrinsic value (claims based on heritage or preference for static use).
There are multiple narratives competing to explain how knowledge
problems are solved. One of the most enduring is of the lone prospector,
wandering the hills with minimal equipment and getting the “lucky”
strike.57 The persistence of this narrative helps explain the failure of
environmental activists to repeal the General Mining Law of 1872, despite
considerable efforts to do so in the 1990s.58 Some prospectors, unlucky in
California, moved to Nevada and in 1850 struck it rich with the Comstock

55

See ROBERT H. NELSON, HOW MUCH IS GOD WORTH? THE PROBLEMS – ECONOMIC AND
THEOLOGICAL – OF EXISTENCE VALUE 5 (May 1996),
http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Robert%20Nelson%20-%20How%20Much%20Is%20God%
20Worth.pdf.
56
BRUCE YANDLE, MAYA VIJAYARAGHAVAN & MADHUSUDAN BHATTARAI, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE: A PRIMER 02-1 (2002), https://www.perc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/environmental-kuznets-curve-primer.pdf.
57
That was true in much of the west. Tens of thousands of prospectors poured into
California in 1849 alone when they heard of the 1848 gold discovery. J.S. HOLLIDAY, THE
WORLD RUSHED IN: THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH EXPERIENCE 292 (1981) (An account of
the mass migration of thousands to California in search of gold drawing from the personal
writings of William Swain and hundreds of other aspiring prospectors). The original
discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill may not have been just a lucky strike. A biography of
James Marshall, the man who found the gold, claims Marshall believed the area contained
minerals and was in the habit of inspecting the mill race for signs. George Frederic
Parsons, The Life and Adventures of James W. Marshall, in FROM MEXICAN DAYS TO THE
GOLD RUSH 89 (Doyce B. Nunis, Jr., ed., 1993). Whether luck or skill, investment is less
likely to be made in prospecting if mineral finds cannot be exploited.
58
Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners, & Andrew Dorchak, Homesteading Rock: A
Defense of Free Access Under the General Mining Law of 1872, 54 Envt’l. L. 745, 786
(2004).
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Lode.59 To motivate them to undertake the hazardous journey and
investment of time and labor in searching for resources, the prospectors
(and later, the investors who funded development of the Comstock) needed
some assurance of ability to keep what they found and developed. The
customary law developed by mining camps provided that assurance.60
Another story is of the innovator who develops a new theory that predicts
the existence of a resource but which the mainstream of the profession does
not accept. For example, the discovery of the Spindletop oil field in
Beaumont, Texas in 1900 by Anthony Francis Lucas, was based on Lucas’
salt dome theory, which was not accepted by others prior to his discovery.61
In more recent times the investment is often in research and data analysis
by teams of scientists and engineers, which ultimately leads to discovery of
valuable natural resources.62
More recently, a counter-narrative of rapacious and often foreignowned businesses seeking to exploit a local population’s resources has
become an important tool in campaigns by opponents of extractive
industries to prevent development of mineral resources or for governments
to extract higher payments when efforts are successful.63
59

See GRANT H. SMITH, THE HISTORY OF THE COMSTOCK LODE: 1850-1997 2 (1998). The
first person to discover gold in Nevada was on his way to California from Utah when he
poked around in the Carson River in 1850. It was several more years before the Comstock
Lode was discovered, but the news of any gold brought many prospectors to Nevada. Id. at
1.
60
JOHN R. UMBECK, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 132 (1981) (providing details of the
“not once but 500 times” miners in California, in the absence of formal law, established
contract and property law among themselves to allow for productive exploitation of
resources).
61
See JAMES ANTHONY CLARK & MICHEL T. HALBOUTY, SPINDLETOP (1952).
62
Industry news is routinely filled with stories about data analytics. See, e.g., Piyuch
Pankah et al., Boosting the Power of Big Data for Completions, in WORLD OIL (June 2018).
63
Peru, a major source of minerals, has experienced opposition by environmental groups to
mining practices. See, e.g., Toni Johnson, Peru’s Mineral Wealth and Woes, in COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (2010), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/perus-mineral-wealth-andwoes; Brant McGee, The Community Referendum: Participatory Democracy and the Right
to Free, Prior and Informed Consent to Development, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 570 (2009)
(discussing national governments working with mining interests to exploit mineral with
little or no benefit for people residing in the area and, in some instances, their facing
violence and environmental destruction). Recent episodes of raising the price of mining
include threats against the industry by the president of the Philippines. See Louise Maureen
Simeon, Miners Say They Follow Environmental Laws after Duterte Warning, PHILSTAR
GLOBAL (July 13, 2017), http://www.philstar.com/business/2017/07/13/1719224/miners-saythey-follow-environmental-laws-after-duterte-warning. After much bluster, deals were
apparently cut to allow operations to resume. Manolo Serapio, Philippines Lifts Two-Year
Ban on Mining Exploration, REUTERS (July 31, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usphilippines-mining/philippines-lifts-two-year-ban-on-mining-explorationidUSKBN1KL11S. Indonesia, as has occurred in earlier episodes, “renegotiated” existing
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Finally, there are business and entrepreneurial narratives that connect
to resources. One counter narrative about Rockefeller to the robber baron
story is that his genius for organizing the petroleum development, refining,
and marketing underlay his success as he drove down prices for an array of
new products.64 Today, entrepreneurs find opportunities in things from
creative water rights contracts65 to housing in areas of ecological
importance that does not destroy habitat.66
The nineteenth century American West offers many examples for
entrepreneurial narratives: miners who innovated in governance to create
mining districts,67 cattlemen who recognized the value of the grasslands of
the Great Plains,68 and entrepreneurs who saw that the mineral booms were
not a flash in the pan but the beginning of a long-term migration so they
built businesses to serve the miners.69 Now, markets and property rights
proponents can build these into narratives about property rights
entrepreneurs. Environmental entrepreneurs protect habitat for waterfowl
by raising funds from hunters to help assure a healthy supply of game birds

deals for successful mining operations. See Indonesia Issues New Tax Rules as Freeport
Seeks Fiscal Guarantee, REUTERS (August 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usindonesia-tax-mining/indonesia-issues-new-tax-rules-as-freeport-seeks-fiscal-guaranteeidUSKBN1KT0MZ.
64
The firm was not the monster it is still often portrayed to be. See Elizabeth Granitz &
Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by ‘Raising Rivals’ Costs’: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.
L. & ECON. 1 (1996); see also John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case, 1 J. L. & ECON. 137 (1958); RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D.
ROCKEFELLER, SR. 50 (1998).
65
The Jicarilla Apache Nation, once its water rights were established, has been able to lease
water rights to public and private users. Justin Nyberg, The Promise of Indian Water
Leasing: An Examination of One Tribe’s Success at Brokering Its Surplus Water
Rights, 55 NAT. RESOURCES J. 181, 182 (2014). Functioning water markets can help deal
with the problems of drought. See, e.g., Vanessa Casado-Perez, Missing Water Markets: A
Cautionary Tale of Government Failure, 23 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 157, 163 (2015).
66
See, e.g., Jessica B. Wilkinson & Robert Bendick, The Next Generation of Mitigation:
Advancing Conservation Through Landscape-Level Mitigation Planning, 40 ELR 10023
(2010).
67
See Umbeck, supra note 60; CHARLES R. SHINN, LAND LAWS OF MINING
DISTRICTS (1884). See also Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen:
Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 581 (1998) (discussing role of private methods of establishing order).
68
See LEWIS ATHERTON, THE CATTLE KINGS (1961); ERNEST STAPLES OSGOOD, THE DAY OF
THE CATTLEMEN (1929); HELENA HUNTINGTON SMITH, THE WAR ON POWDER RIVER (1966);
ROBERT H. FLETCHER, FREE GRASS TO FENCES (1960); MARI SANDOZ, THE CATTLEMEN
(1958); WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS (1931).
69
Often the service providers, such as Leland Stanford, did better than the prospectors.
RICHARD RAYNER, THE ASSOCIATES: FOUR CAPITALISTS WHO CREATED CALIFORNIA 1415 (2009).
265
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol11/iss3/5

22

Morriss et al.: Finding Better Words: Markets, Property, Rights, and Resources

Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

by paying farmers to leave or enhance prairie potholes.70 Anglers in
England join associations to sue polluters who reduced water, and therefore
fish quality.71 Fish have been protected in rivers during times of low flow
by organizations that contract with farmers who own water rights to ensure
water stays in rivers rather than be directed to crops.72 People pay to see the
land kept in agricultural production rather than developed, so millions of
acres are protected by easements.73
The narrative that frames the issue connects with knowledge problems
because it either poses the resource discoverer as a virtuous person (or
organization), who is rewarded for creating value, or as someone merely
transferring value (often in ways of questionable legitimacy) from others to
himself. If the former narrative governs, then the goal will be to enable the
virtuous entrepreneur to create value, as we next discuss. If the latter
narrative governs, then the goal will be to find ways to contain the
scoundrel who seeks to rob us of our patrimony. Environmental
entrepreneurs who want to make use of existing legal tools, rather than
press for one-size-fits-all legislated mandates, have much work to do. Socalled “green” energy projects threaten Native American heritage and
inflict environmental damages anew.74
Problem 1: An economic actor (individual,
organization) invests to identify a valuable resource
(place of natural beauty, critical habitat, mineral
deposit, etc.) Without investment, the resource would
not be discovered, developed, or protected.
B.

Rights Recognition: Tradeoffs Among Conflicting Uses

70

Henry Holmes, Protecting Wetlands: Environmental Federalism and Grassroots
Conservation in the Prairie Pothole Region, 10 ARIZ. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 365, 396 (2020).
71
Roger Bate, Protecting English and Welsh Rivers: The Role of the Anglers’ Conservation
Association, in COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT Ch. 3 (Roger Meiners & Andrew
Morriss eds., 2000).
72
Barton H. Thompson Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.
261, 286-291 (2000).
73
Jess R. Phelps, Defining the Role of Agriculture in Agricultural Conservation Easements,
45 ECOLOGY L. Q. 647, 650 (2018).
74
Allison M. Dussias, Room for a (Sacred) View? American Indian Tribes Confront Visual
Desecration Caused by Wind Energy Projects, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 333 (2013). We are
often remiss in admitting that “Green projects … sometimes they are not so green after all.
Even the most environmentally friendly projects may result in some kinds of environmental
harm.” John Copeland Nagle, Symposium on Green Technology & Infrastructure Article:
Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 ND J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 59, 59-60 (2023).
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There are often multiple uses for resources. A river can be a water
source for agriculture, paper mills, city dwellers’ homes, trout habitat, or a
wild place for the contemplation of nature. In political struggles about
water, among other resources, Native American rights have often been
ignored despite treaties that promised to protect them.75 Which use is
chosen depends in part on tastes (which may change over time), technology
(how expensive is it to treat discharges and how valuable is the output?),
knowledge (how much water do fish need?), and other factors. Conflict
over uses may be resolved one way at one time and another way at a
different time and one way under one set of institutional constraints and
another way under a different set of constraints. The proposed Mineral
King ski resort in California is an example of such conflict.
In 1965, the U.S. Forest Service awarded the Walt Disney Co. a permit
to develop a ski resort in the Sierra Nevada mountains on Sequoia National
Forest land in the Mineral King valley, a former silver mining area.
Constructing the resort would require access via an all-weather highway,
or, in a later version, a cog railway through the Sequoia National Park. The
Sierra Club, which had backed the idea of a ski resort in the area, later sued
to block the development and it was eventually abandoned.76
Of course, to the environmentalists trying to stop the ski resort
development, it was a battle between good (environmentalists) and evil
(developers and the skiers). Turner and Clifton’s Wild by Law: The Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund and the Places it Has Saved called the court
opinion resulting from the fight over Mineral King “one of the most
important Supreme Court decisions ever rendered on environmental
matters.”77 A later commentator suggested that the Sierra Club “places
more importance on Sierra Club v. Morton (1972) [the court decision that
resulted], and its role in Mineral King controversy, than it may actually
deserve.”78 To the Sierra Club, when it became an opponent of the resort,
any intrusion into the national park (even light rail) was unacceptable and
opponents of the resort believed that the Mineral King valley “belonged” in
75

See, e.g., Roger E. Meiners & Lea-Rachel Kosnik, Restoring Harmony in the Klamath
Basin PS-27 (Property and Environment Research Center, 2003),
https://www.perc.org/2002/12/20/restoring-harmony-in-the-klamath-basin/.
76
Werner Weiss, Walt Disney’s Mineral King, YESTERLAND (Dec. 16,
2011), http://www.yesterland.com/mineralking.html.
77
TOM TURNER & CARR CLIFTON, WILD BY LAW: THE SIERRA CLUB LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
AND THE PLACES IT HAS SAVED 3 (1990).
78
Alexandra K. Vicknair, Mindsets, Motivations, Mickey Mouse, and the Mountains: The
Social, Political, and Intellectual Foundations of the Mineral King Controversy, 1965–
1978 8
(2013), https://scholarworks.csustan.edu/bitstream/handle/011235813/265/VicknairA.spring
2013thesis.pdf?sequence=1. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 728 (1972).
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the park rather than the national forest, and so should not be made into a
recreation site.79 Disney, on the other hand, envisioned creating access to
the site as a benefit—he had said of the valley “When I first saw Mineral
King five years ago, I thought it was one of the most beautiful spots I had
ever seen and we want to keep it that way.”80 Disney did not want to
destroy it, he wanted to expand access to it. And, of course, make money
while doing so. Disney thus solved Problem 1 in a way that conflicted with
the Sierra Club’s vision for Mineral King in which lack of access was a bug
and not a feature.
The legal battle over Mineral King gets at the critical question in
conflicting resource uses: whose claim for exclusive rights will be
recognized? In Mineral King, the initial decision makers were the Forest
Service and the National Park Service, who controlled the land. They did
not recognize the Sierra Club as having a role in making the decision. The
Forest Service brought Disney and capital markets, where funds would be
raised for the development, into the discussion. The Forest Service’s initial
narrative of itself as a guardian of the public interest and evaluator of the
proposition of the resort was supported by Disney and the capital markets.
The Sierra Club disrupted this narrative, casting itself as the guarantor of
the public and the environment’s interest, relegating the Forest Service to a
subservient role. The Sierra Club suit raised the issue of whether others had
an interest that needed to be recognized. The Supreme Court’s decision
opened the door to include broader interests by allowing the Sierra Club
standing to object based on members’ interest in hiking in National Forest
lands that would become the resort. Justice William O. Douglas suggested
in a dissent that he would go further, allowing the valley to itself appear,
represented by the Sierra Club.81
To state the obvious, conflicting use problems arise when there are
differences of opinion over the use of a resource. The problem is choosing
a decision rule that allocates authority to resolve the conflict. A key part of
the decision rule is deciding whose rights are recognized in the decision
process. The narrative supporting property rights solutions focuses on
incentives for individual property owners to be free to maximize the value
of resources they control as they see best, which could include doing
nothing. To the Forest Service and other government entities, Disney
would develop the area in the manner they believed most beneficial. The
Disney narrative was giving more of the public access to “one of the most
beautiful spots.”82
79

Id. at 132.
Weiss, supra note 76.
81
Morton, 405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
82
Weiss, supra note 76.
80
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By contrast, the narrative supporting state-centric solutions focuses on
the divergence between the private and public valuations of different uses.
In that account, Disney would benefit from the resort but the broader public
would potentially lose a valued wilderness site. Inserting a public guardian
was necessary to protect public values and make the tradeoff. The problem
was that there were public guardians involved in developing the valley: the
Forest Service and the National Park Service, as well as various California
state and local authorities, and the outcome was still not what
environmentalists wanted. Their solution was to broaden the discussion
beyond simply asserting public values to a structure that granted a private
association the right to participate in the decision-making process at its
discretion.83 The debate over standing to challenge agency actions is how
the legal system addressed this problem. In that lens, the Sierra Club’s
victory reflected a change in the underlying public narrative rather than
initiating it.84 No longer were government agencies sufficient to represent
the public interest, it now became simple for private parties to intervene in
such decision processes. In this sense, there are multiple yet to be
completed but competing stories that seek to become the controlling
narrative of how Americans utilize and respect the Mineral King.
An earlier resource conflict illustrates a similar iteration of this
problem. In California, between 1870 and 1884, hydraulic miners battled
with downstream farmers over the substantial runoff (tons of rock and
mud) from mining that threatened the farmers’ fields.85 In 1884, the
farmers won a federal court injunction that effectively ended the practice of
hydraulic mining based on its destructive impact on downstream land.86
This was a significant win for the capacity of ordinary property law to
adjudicate the relative rights of parties—but it required applying legal
principles to a new problem in a new context and reframing the narrative
from facilitating mining (California’s original view) to preserving
California farmland’s productive capacity.87 Similarly, in the U.K., a
83

See, e.g., Don Harris, Mineral King: Breaking Down the Courthouse
Door, EARTHJUSTICE, https://earthjustice.org/features/mineral-king-breaking-down-thecourthouse-door (last visited Apr. 17, 2021).
84
As Finley Peter Dunne’s fictional Mr. Dooley observed, the Supreme Court follows the
election returns and 1970’s Earth Day happened on its doorstep. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR.
DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (New York: R.H. Russell, 1901) (“th’ supreme coort follow th’
iliction returns.”)
85
ROBERT L. KELLY, GOLD VS. GRAIN: THE HYDRAULIC MINING CONTROVERSY IN
CALIFORNIA’S SACRAMENTO VALLEY (1959) (A detailed history of hydraulic gold mining in
California and the battle between miners and farmers over the practice ending with the
Sawyer decision of 1884).
86
Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 756 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
87
Kelly, supra note 85.
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private association of anglers successfully used its members’ recognized
legal claims to fishing rights to force the cleanup of rivers.88 Actors
equipped with rights are capable of solving conflicts of use.
Problem 2: The owner of a resource has a choice
between two uses, one of which preserves more
‘natural’ aspects of the area containing the resource
than the other. Others seek to assert an interest in the
decision. Which interests have a right to a say in the
resolution?
C.

Rights Security: Funding Development and Preservation

Preservation or development of resources both involve costs.
Preservation incurs monitoring, remediation, and opportunity costs. Where
preservation requires taking valuable rights from private parties,
compensation may need to be paid. For example, in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court held that a South
Carolina administrative agency’s refusal to allow a landowner to build any
structure on his property amounted to a taking.89 Similarly, to induce
conservation, governments may offer incentives. For example,
conservation easements that meet particular criteria are eligible for tax
benefits that reduce the cost of conservation for landowners.90 Preservation
efforts may have political impacts that reduce authorities’ support for
conservation. For example, efforts by (mostly foreign) conservationists to
stop development in the Argentine region of Patagonia has been opposed
by some local residents.91
A central difference in opinion in the competing narratives over
resources rests on who should compensate whom when conservation
measures require foregoing development or development efforts
88

Bate, supra note 40.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-1032 (1992). Lucas had been
told he could walk or sit on his property and pay property taxes on it, but otherwise do
nothing despite it being zoned for single family construction at the time of purchase. The
Court noted that the administrative ruling effectively destroyed all value of the property (on
which he still had to pay taxes). Had the agency limited what he could do on the land, such
as only park an RV rather than build a house, it seems likely he would not have received
compensation.
90
C. Andrew Lafond & Jeffery J. Schrader, Charitable Contributions of Conservation
Easements, J. ACCOUNTANCY (2011),
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2011/nov/20103603.html.
91
Oliver Balch, Private Parks, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2005),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2005/oct/04/argentina.internationalnews.
89
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compromise conservation.92 Those inclined to support property rights
solutions see the collective compensating the individual for taking of
valuable rights as fundamental to properly align incentives for
governments. The Lucas case, in which a South Carolina state agency
sought to prevent construction on a beachfront lot without paying
compensation, is a prime example. When the Supreme Court ruled that the
Takings Clause required it to pay compensation, the South Carolina Coastal
Commission decided it was willing to have the property developed after
all.93 On the other hand, some advocates for preservation reject the notion
that resource owners should be compensated for not engaging in what they
see as socially detrimental activities.94 For many environmental activists,
paying someone not to do something they should not do in the first place is
wrong as a matter of principle.95 This conflict of view is a recurrent feature
of resource disputes.
Those inclined to support state-centered approaches often seek
compensation from those seeking to develop property. In Dolan v. City of
Tigard, the owner of a plumbing store sought a permit to expand the
store.96 The city planning commission conditioned the permit on dedication
of land to a public greenway.97 While the Supreme Court rejected this as an
unconstitutional taking of Dolan’s land,98 the city’s supporters saw the
requirement as reasonable compensation by the store owner for the
environmental burden the expansion would place on the community.99
92

Coase, infra note 129. Coase identified the assignment of rights as critical where
transactions costs prevented bargaining to reallocate them. One resolution to such
differences is reducing the cost of reaching such bargains.
93
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 61 (1995).
94
See Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and
Palila/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. R. 331 (2004) (This article examines four cases to
describe how litigation efforts have shaped massive change in the area of environmental
law). This commentary is hostile to Lucas and his construction projects.
95
Epstein makes a similar point about anti-whaling discourse.
Speaking the anti-whaling discourse marks you as someone who cares about
whales. In other words, it does not just do something for the whales (according to
the discourse itself) but it says something about the individual who has stepped
into that subject-position. It casts her as a compassionate, environmentally
mindful, and quintessentially ‘good’ person. First, this ‘stepping into’ is envisaged
here as a dynamic process.
Epstein, supra note 4, at 168-9.
96
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
97
Id. at 379-80.
98
Id. at 396.
99
See, e.g., David Ackerly, Exactions for Transportation Corridors After Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 247, 249 (1995) (decision “fails to allow city planners the
flexibility necessary to design creative solutions to reduce the negative impacts of regional
development.”).
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When preservation requires ongoing monitoring, that must be
funded.100 Restoring a resource to a prior state or improving its condition
can require substantial funding as well and innovative funding mechanisms
can be important.101 Similarly, development is expensive; the process of
physically extracting a mineral resource is often costly.102 The long and
capital-intensive nature of many resource development projects make them
vulnerable to expropriation.103
Developing or protecting a resource goes beyond physical costs.
Creating legal infrastructure to support new resource uses can be costly.
Many western states’ water law, based on prior appropriation principles,
relied on a definition of “beneficial use” that required removal of water
from the stream.104 This prevented in-stream uses from qualifying and
required changing state laws to permit contractual arrangements to keep
water in stream for wildlife conservation use.105 Conservation easements

100

“Often, land trusts often ask landowners to make a stewardship contribution when they
donate an easement. But the costs of stewardship sometimes exceed the amount a landowner
can reasonably contribute — so you may need to raise funds from other sources, as well.”
See, e.g., Funding for Stewardship, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
https://www.landtrustalliance.org/topics/stewardship (This article discusses failings related
to the perpetuity requirement of section 170(h) conservation easement tax incentives, and
proposes solutions for the long-term effectiveness of this conservation program); Nancy A.
McLaughin, Tax-Deductible Conservation Easements and the Essential Perpetuity
Requirements, 37 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2017). An example of (costly) litigation to enforce
conservation easements is Four B Properties, LLC v. Nature Conservancy, 458 P.3d 832
(Wy. 2020).
101
John Schwartz, Envisioning Profit in Environmental Good Works, N. Y. TIMES (July 12,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/us/equity-firm-restores-louisiana-marshlandto-earn-credits-it-can-sell.html.
102
E.g., Will Kennedy & Felix Njini, Fate of South African Gold Rests on Giant, LossMaking Mine, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-29/fate-of-south-african-gold-rests-onone-giant-loss-making-mine (the “South Deep” mine near Johannesburg has cost Gold
Fields Ltd. $2.3 billion to develop without great promise of recovery); Darren Gray, PNG
Gold and Copper Mine to Cost JV Partners an Extra $1bn Upfront, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/newcrest-to-spendextra-1bn-on-png-gold-and-copper-mine-20180319-p4z53q.html (Newcrest Mining had to
come up with more funds to push forward on a mine in Papua New Guinea).
103
See Harold L. Cole & William B. English, Expropriation and Direct Investment, 30 J.
INT. ECON. 201 (1991) (This article discusses the conditions for expropriation of foreign
investments and means of avoiding such a scenario through cost-benefit analysis of host
countries in a variety of investment scenarios).
104
Sandra Zellmer, Legal Tools for Instream Flow Protection, in INTEGRATED APPROACHES
TO RIVERINE RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP: CASE STUDIES, SCIENCE, LAW, PEOPLE, AND POLICY
285, 287 (Allan Locke, et al. eds., 2008).
105
Id. at 289-93.
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also require legal infrastructure to be effective.106 In such cases, there is a
need to recognize the beneficial aspects of making rights fully transferable,
which is to say, those who wish to purchase in-stream flow rights and hold
them should be able to compete evenly with others who wish to purchase
rights for withdrawal purposes. Ownership asymmetries, such as those seen
with Bureau of Land Management grazing rights and Forest Service
auctioning of timber cutting rights, prevent environmentalists, for example,
from purchasing or leasing those rights and retiring them.107
In general, funding either development or conservation requires capital
market or philanthropic support. Both impose their own disciplines. The
fixed capital intensity and long timelines of many resource extraction
projects pose particular challenges.108 Donors may be unwilling to accept
tradeoffs that make preservation less costly.109
106

See Gerald Korngold, Globalizing Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for
International Environmental Protection, 28 WISC. INT’L L. J. 585 (2011).
107
See Kristen Byrne and Hannah Downey, Competition Can Help Resolve Public Lands
Conflicts (2017), https://www.perc.org/2017/07/12/competition-can-help-resolve-publiclands-conflicts/ (outlining the argument that ownership asymmetries prevent stakeholders
from purchasing or leasing rights to retire them).
108
E.g., Amber Smith, Head of Tucson Chamber: With Mining in City’s Blood, it’s Time to
Move Ahead with Rosemont, ARIZONA DAILY STAR (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://tucson.com/opinion/local/amber-smith-with-mining-in-tucson-s-blood-its/article_ae6239a6-314d-53e7-84ca-8669f86a40c7.html (a mining project in Arizona spent
10 years in EIS and other review processes). See also Meredith A. Wegener, Changing
Federal Priorities Midstream in Upstream Development: Federal Energy Development
Lease Cancellations, Environmental Policy, Historic Preservation and Takings, 46 ENV’T L.
979, 987-989 (2016) (examples of delays running over three decades).
109
Jen DeGregorio, Audubon Society Sanctuary Considers Allowing Oil and Gas Drilling,
THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan., 3, 2010),
http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2010/01/audubon_society_sanctuary_cons.html.
The description of the debate is illustrative and so worth considering at length:
Audubon’s internal debate over the sanctuary resembles a problem that has long
confounded Louisiana political leaders as they attempt to preserve what's left of
the coast without disrupting the oil and gas industry, a major source of jobs and
tax dollars for the state. A key difference, however, is Audubon’s uncertainty that
healthy wetlands and fuel production can coexist: The group has tapped
consultants to weigh the pros and cons of drilling in the marsh. State regulators,
by contrast, have treated oil and gas extraction as a foregone conclusion, issuing
hundreds of permits each year to drill or replumb old canals in the coastal zone.
“This is actually quite an interesting opportunity for both conservationists and the
oil industry to see if development can be done differently and if it can be done
economically and in a way that protects the environment,” said Denise Reed, a
coastal scientist at the University of New Orleans, of Audubon’s proposal. Still,
Audubon risks giving the impression that the group is willing to “damage their
property to get money to fix it,” Reed said. Delve into the history of the sanctuary,
and the irony thickens. Audubon, which has owned the Rainey preserve since
1924, allowed prospectors to dredge oilfield access canals across the property
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Funding constraints can influence resource use decisions. Fear of
confiscation of a resource can affect extraction rates.110 Developing a
resource stream from a conservation use can shift the balance to include
more conservation, as in the development of a forest reserve by
International Paper.111 Conversely, a regulation that imposes costs on
particular conditions can lead resource owners to shift their strategy to
reduce those costs. For example, ESA regulations reduced timberland
owners’ land values in areas where red cockaded woodpeckers nested.112
By reducing the age at which they harvested trees, the landowners could
reduce the desirability of the land for the woodpeckers.113 The increased
presence of woodpeckers led to harvesting younger trees, reducing
habitat.114
Narratives over resource decisions rarely center around funding.
Conservation narratives are typically framed in terms of removing
considerations of financing from the discussions and are cast as moral
imperatives (which suggest that financing should be irrelevant) or efforts to
align private and alleged social costs, usually to stop investment in
development.115 Framing decisions this way tends to reduce opportunities
beginning in the 1940s. Fuel production continued until 1999, when the last of
Audubon's energy leases expired and the group banned such activity. Audubon's
former chief operating officer, Daniel Beard, condemned the policy in 2001,
saying that the oil production caused “irreparable, long-term damage” to Paul J.
Rainey’s wetlands. But Kemp argues that Audubon can do better this time by
forcing companies to go beyond the requirements of Louisiana drilling laws,
which an Audubon study found to be lax compared with those of other states.
New technology has made drilling less invasive, and careful monitoring could
minimize damage -- making it worth the cash for coastal restoration. “That's the
tightrope that we walk,” Kemp said. “We don’t necessarily want to do drilling
unless there is some environmental gain.”
See also Shawn Reagan, What Would Environmentalists Do if They Owned ANWR?,
REASON (Feb. 5, 2015), https://reason.com/archives/2015/02/05/what-wouldenvironmentalists-do-if-they.
110
Wegener, supra note 108, at 982 (claiming endless delays in permitting is close to
confiscation and raises Fifth Amendment issues regarding compensation).
111
TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPITALISTS: DOING GOOD WHILE
DOING WELL 4-8 (1997).
112
Lueck & Michael, supra note 22. See also Richard L. Stroup & Andrew P. Morriss,
Quartering Species: The “Living Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the Endangered
Species Act, 30 ENV’T L. 769, 790-91 (2000).
113
Lueck & Michael, supra note 22, at 31-55.
114
Id. at 35-51.
115
E.g., Peter Manus, One Hundred Years of Green: A Perspective on Three Twentieth
Century Nature Philosophers, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 557, 659-60 (1998) (“As a religious man,
[Al] Gore brings to environmental law and politics [John] Muir’s morality of nature
preservation.”) The moral ethic applies globally. See Amelia Chizwala Peterson,
Articulating Moral Bases for Regional Responses to Deforestation and Climate Change:
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for compromise and loses the opportunity for creative win-win scenarios.116
Compromising a moral imperative is costlier for the parties than
compromising over a pragmatic point.117 By contrast, market and property
rights narratives are often focused on incentive structures for decisionmakers, seeking to align incentives properly without adding the complexity
of the impact of financing structures.118 This opens space for creative
solutions.
Problem 3: A resource owner decides between a
development or conservation use that requires capital
to accomplish. The owner must account for the
constraints imposed by the funding mechanism. For
development, investors must be compensated for risks;
for conservation, investors must receive monetary
and/or non-monetary returns that can impact the form
of the investment.

Africa, 38 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y. REV. 81, 117 (2013) (“Harnessing the old
morality, a seemingly gigantic feat for any civilization, is probably the only way that Africa
can begin to reverse the demise of its natural landscape and mount an appropriate, moral
response to its own role in the destruction of the global ecosystem.”) See also CHRISTOPHER
D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?: LAW, MORALITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2010).
116
See, e.g., BEATRICE CHAYTOR & JONA RAZZAQUE, LIBERALISING TRADE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AND SERVICES: IN SEARCH OF ‘WIN-WIN-WIN’ OUTCOMES, 38
(2011) (“The prospects for ‘win-win-win’ achievements depend on determining a more
precise definition of environmental goods and services, which will facilitate the
identification to barriers to trade in goods and services included in the industry.”) See also
Vanessa A. Masterson, Maria Spierenburg & Maria Tengö, The Trade-Offs of Win-Win
Conservation Rhetoric: Exploring Place Meanings in Community Conservation on the Wild
Coast, South Africa, 14 SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE 639 (2019) (a critical assessment of
focusing on “win-win” outcomes framed by economics).
117
Organizations might not compromise as a way of showing their commitment to
supporters that they can be trusted to keep the faith; those who “sell out” may lose
prospective supporters. Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental
Consequences of Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REV. 301, 310-11 (2008)
(“Although some environmental economists support compensation on efficiency or
environmental conservation grounds, environmental lobbying organizations are unanimous
in their opposition to statutory or judicially imposed compensation requirements. According
to the Sierra Club, takings compensation proposals are part of ‘an overt and calculated
attack on the environment.’”).
118
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (explaining the impact of insecure property
rights on the availability of capital and its adverse impact on the poor).
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D.

Providing Effective Public Institutions: Corruption

Resources involve decisions about valuable assets. When decision
makers do not own the assets, there is an opportunity for the decision
maker to trade a decision for benefits that accrue to the decision maker.119
Those controlling access to valuable activities may be bribed to secure
permission for a wide range of activities.120 Corruption is not simply a
matter of bribes to individuals, although political decisions that allocate
access to valuable resources can be influenced by campaign contributions
and other gifts, legal and illegal. Decision makers can use their power to
steer resources to favored interest groups. Such behavior by regulators
could be classified as corruption as decision makers seek to benefit favored
constituents at the expense of others.121 This problem exists anywhere
decision makers do not bear the full costs or reap the full benefits of their
decisions. The problem appears to be particularly widespread where
resources are involved because of the high value of many resource
decisions.122
The structure of the institutions dealing with resources affects the
likelihood and scope of corruption. As Hernando de Soto noted in his study
of the informal sector in Peru, where the regulatory state intruded into
119

Government actors can threaten to impose costs on economic actors in return for
campaign support and other benefits. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent
Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUDIES 101, 107-108 (1987).
The seminal work on this point is George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).
120
Many nations do little to discourage international bribery, including countries that are
often thought of as having a strong legal system, such as Denmark. See TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, EXPORTING CORRUPTION 2020: DENMARK (2020),
https://www.transparency.org/en/projects/exporting-corruption/data/denmark. Firms must
also deal with bribery issues. E.g., Jon Emont et al., Amazon Investigates Employees
Leaking Data for Bribes, W.S.J. (Sep. 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazoninvestigates-employees-leaking-data-for-bribes-1537106401.
121
Voters rarely know the details of how policies are implemented. No politician admits to
playing politics with the environment, but special interests appear to play a big role in how
the details work out. The best documented story is how the Clean Air Act was crafted to
respond to special interests. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN
COAL/DIRTY AIR OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT
FOR HIGH-SULPHUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981).
122
See Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins, Corruption, Underdevelopment, and Extractive Resource
Industries: Addressing the Vicious Cycle, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 235 (2006) (describing
extractive resource industry as “an arena wherein the conditions for corruption and its link
with low human development are especially intense and pernicious, and subject to a selfreinforcing vicious cycle.”) See also Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project,
https://www.occrp.org/en/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2021) (on-going reporting of widespread
corruption).
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virtually all decisions in the 1980s, the lack of inclusion in the formal legal
system creates the conditions under which corruption can flourish:
In the redistributive state, the enviable capacity to be generous with
other people's money is an invitation to corruption. In the struggle
for wealth and favorable redistribution, no means are spared. And
as corruption grows, so does anarchy. In a country where the law
can be bought, where both left- and right-wing political parties
agree that it is the state's prerogative to regulate and legislate in
detail, and where the false ethic of redistributive justice has
evaded and consigned to oblivion the ethic of productive justice,
there are no secure property rights and no legal incentives
for creating wealth.123
Ironically, many state-centered resource narratives focus on corruption
at external individual or firm levels and fail to focus on natural resource
states’ internal incentive structures.124 The affected states seek to control
corruption by restricting opportunities to move the proceeds of corruption
out of the corrupt state or by changing the behavior of external natural
resource business.125 For example, efforts to restrict use of “conflict
minerals,” where funds flow to those engaged in violence (often over
control of the minerals) fall into this category.126 These narratives focus the
corruption inquiry away from the creation of opportunities for corruption
by giving discretionary authority to state actors and focus instead on the

123

HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH 199 (1989).
E.g., Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 419
(2015) (focusing on the fact that most firms fail to engage in honest reporting about the
origins of minerals as related to human rights and labor practices).
125
In 2000 the World Bank pressed Chad, ranked one of the most corrupt nations by
Transparency International (and as the most corrupt nation in 2005. See Corruption
Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2005 (last accessed Apr. 16, 2021)) to take steps to
avoid the resource curse problem as a condition for funding for an oil pipeline. The agreed
solution was for ExxonMobil to deposit oil revenues in an escrow account at Citibank. An
independent committee would oversee spending to ensure that most oil money went for
poverty-reduction measures. Once the oil revenue began to arrive in 2005, Chad reneged.
See Jeffrey Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse, NBER WORKING PAPER 15836, 33 (2010).
See also Uwafiokun Idemudia, The Resource Curse and the Decentralization of Oil
Revenue: The Case of Nigeria, 35 J. CLEANER PROD. 183, 185 (2012), (noting that these
“agencies and laws are managed and implemented by government officials that benefit from
corruption”).
126
Attempting to “discipline” bad actors in such instances, as the United States has done in
the Congo, can backfire. See Parker & Vadheim, supra note 44.
124
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disposal of the proceeds of corruption.127 Market and property rights
narratives often focus on the corruption potential by public decision
makers, seeking to avoid the problem by shifting decisions to property
owners who bear the loss of poor decisions. State-centric narratives focus
on corruption in the private sector. Neither can exist without the other. Of
course, when corruption prevails across government agents, agencies, and
law enforcement, the slim prospects for gaining improved management of
resources that remain may rest on the actions of extended families and
other groups that provide private protection for important resource assets.
Problem 4: A resource owner seeks to implement a
conservation or development plan that requires public
or private approvals from a public or private
organization. Securing approvals requires action by a
bureaucracy. The bureaucracy demands
certain/specific favors in exchange for granting the
approvals.
E.

Conflict Resolution: Interfering with Others’ Rights

Resource use by one entity can impact use by others. In Sturges v.
Bridgeman,128 the 1879 British case around which Ronald Coase built some
of his analysis in The Problem of Social Cost, a confectioner’s thumping
machinery made a doctor’s consulting room on the other side of a party
wall useless.129 Often, ordinary principles of tort and property law suffice to
settle such disputes and the primary economic problem is whether or not
barriers to bargaining prevent value-increasing deals from being struck.
The barriers may not be as difficult as commonly asserted. For example, in
the U.K., a private association of fishers repeatedly sued polluters and won
127

Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook found this problem on Indian reservations—the lack of a
trustworthy rule of law keeps investors out. See Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (July 16,
2017), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103892215949831.
128
Sturges v. Bridgeman [1879] 11 Ch.D. 852 (UK App. Cas.).
129
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 8-10 (1960) (holding
that the doctor, who came to the noise, had the right not to suffer from the noise) Legal
historian A.W. Brian Simpson challenged Coase’s interpretation of the Sturges, suggesting
that there were already community norms in place that solved the conflict and that the
economic analysis proposed by Coase was alien to how courts considered such conflicts.
See A.W.B. Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Re-examined, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 53 (1997); A.W.B.
Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Re-Examined: An Addendum, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 99-101. We take
Simpson’s point and are not arguing that courts are using economic logic unconsciously (we
wish they would, of course), but that the executive and legislative branches ought to be
doing so explicitly and the courts ought to pay more attention to the on-the-ground norms
developed by real people making real choices about real resources.
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injunctive relief, forcing clean ups of streams and rivers.130 Where legal
systems are underdeveloped or corrupt, this option is not available. In those
instances, the problem is not peculiar to resources but larger in scope.
In some cases, there are problems that traditional tort and property law
may not address. For example, where a mine poses an environmental
hazard long after closure, the mine owner may no longer exist or have
assets capable of resolving the problem.131 Some collective response may
be needed to address these cases, both ex post where the problem is now in
existence and ex ante by preventing it through bonding requirements.
Abandoned contaminated property was part of the narrative that supported
creation of the Superfund.132 Conflating the ex post and ex ante problems
can create conceptual confusion in economic terms; ex post requires a
societal response, ex ante adequate bonding and insurance.133
The primary problems for rights interference are where the harms
asserted or the rights sought to be vindicated are not cognizable under
current legal rules. For example, if extraction of a resource contributes to a
global environmental problem, the potential class of parties seeking input
into a resource decision goes beyond national boundaries.134 The claims of
low-lying island state governments that their physical existence is
threatened by greenhouse gases emissions that mean rising oceans is an
example of such claims.135
Claims can come from conservation measures as well. A farming
community can be devastated by restrictions on farmers’ water use.136 The

130

Numerous small membership fees paid the cost of litigation, which was routinely in
favor of the fishers. Bate, supra note 40, at 384.
131
John F. Seymour, Hardrock Mining and the Environment: Issues of Federal Enforcement
and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 807 (2004) (“No one knows how many abandoned …
mining sites are scattered across the lands of the west” but the Western Governors’
Association estimates hundreds of thousands).
132
See RICHARD STROUP, SUPERFUND: THE SHORTCUT THAT FAILED (1996),
https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ps5.pdf.
133
Morriss et al., supra note 58 at 786 (“With the support of both environmental pressure
groups and mining interests, BLM created bonding requirements that safeguard against
future harms.”).
134
See generally Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Borders & the Environment, 39
ENV’T L. 141 (2009) (Asserting that citizens of rich nations could do more for the
environment and people simply by shifting future expenditures to funding remediation
measures in countries with poor, less rigid environmental laws thereby creating a more
efficient and environmentally productive structure).
135
Corel Davenport, The Marshall Islands are Disappearing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/02/world/The-Marshall-Islands-AreDisappearing.html.
136
The long fight in California arising from the delta smelt is one example. See Tiny
Endangered Fish Highlights California Drought Conflicts, CBS NEWS (Aug. 4, 2015),
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farmers will no longer spend money at the equipment dealer or the seed
supplier, who in turn reduce their spending at other businesses. Expanding
recognition of rights “too far” can lead to a “tragedy of the anti-commons”
in which activity grinds to a halt because the transaction costs of
negotiating agreements with everyone holding a rights claim that can veto a
solution exceed the benefits of the agreement.137 The fundamental problem
here is determining the scope and scale of the rights recognized as
implicated by the resource allocation decision. Traditional legal principles
keep both relatively small through requirements of showing direct harm
attributable to the resource owner’s decision and non-recognition of many
types of harm.138
State-oriented narratives focus on the state preventing A from harming
B through resource decisions. These generally seek to broaden the scale
and scope of rights to be recognized and protected by the state. Their
solution to the transactions costs problem of large numbers is to shift
bargaining and decision authority to state actors or to NGOs by allowing
broad standing to bring claims.139 Property rights narratives focus on
narrower rights definitions and seek to reduce barriers to transactions. The
advantage for state-oriented narratives is that they can point to a concrete
change (“EPA will protect you from poisoned rivers”) even if the claim is
unsubstantiated or false.
A key underlying challenge is the adaptability of the institutions
involved. Demand for resources, whether for conservation or development
changes with knowledge and preferences.140 Nassim Nicholas Taleb
contends that we need institutions that are “antifragile,” a concept for
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tiny-endangered-fish-highlights-california-droughtconflicts/.
137
See generally, Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (Arguing that anticommons is a useful tool for property theory and thus a greater awareness of anti-commons
may help inform legal policymaking).
138
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) (containing a
general discussion of this principle).
139
Sanne H. Knudsen, Remedying the Misuse of Nature, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 141, 205
(2012) (“a modified citizen suit provision might include the right to intervene in cases
brought by public trustees upon showing of standing and good cause . . .”); Randy Lowell,
Private Actions and Marine and Water Resources: Protection, Recovery and Remediation, 8
S.C. ENV’T L. J. 143, 149 (2000) (“The standing requirement represents one of several
obstacles to a private person’s recovery for damages to water-based natural resources.”).
140
Bison were open access resources hunted to near extinction in the late nineteenth
century. See Geoff Cunfer, Overview: The Decline and Fall of the Bison Empire, in BISON
AND PEOPLE ON THE NORTH AMERICAN GREAT PLAINS: A DEEP ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 1,
18-22 (2016). Now significant private resources are devoted to providing them and other
species habitat to encourage population expansion in a natural setting. See American Prairie
Reserve, https://www.americanprairie.org/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2021).
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which there is no easy word.141 Things that are antifragile improve with
shocks rather than weaken or merely endure. The idea of antifragility
encompasses more than simply surviving a shock (which we might term
robustness or resilience). Instead it means that “[t]he antifragile loves
randomness and uncertainty, which also means—crucially—a love of
errors, a certain class of errors. Antifragility has a singular property of
allowing us to deal with the unknown, to do things without understanding
them—and do them well.”142 Unfortunately, many institutions dealing with
resources are fragile rather than antifragile.
Embedding solutions in statutes and relatively-hard-to-change
regulations—which themselves help create interest groups invested in
continuing those particular structures143—does not promote learning.
Superfund is an example of a program that has failed miserably at its stated
purpose—although it has enriched the legal profession—without a great
deal of learning taking place.144 Neither Congress nor EPA appears
institutionally capable of making adjustments to programs quickly in
response to feedback. The common law, which does a better job of
adjusting to new facts, could enhance antifragility.145
Taleb’s central argument is that we must keep “fragilistas” away from
the levers of power. These are people who make “you engage in policies
and actions, all artificial, in which the benefits are small and visible, and
the side effects potentially severe and invisible.”146 One key characteristic
of Taleb’s solution is requiring people to keep some “skin in the game” to
prevent them from transferring fragility to others. Each party needs “to
have something to lose from it.”147 The idea of “skin in the game” offers a
potential way to determine which claims will be recognized.148 Property
rights solutions provide one avenue for ‘skin in the game.’ Taleb also
argues for building in redundancy as a way to make institutions more
141

NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE 32-33 (2012).
Id. at 4.
143
See Darcy Parks & Anna Wallsten, The Struggles of Smart Energy Places: Regulatory
Lock-In and the Swedish Electricity Market, 110 ANNALS AM. ASSOC. GEOGR. 525, 532
(2020) (describing “regulatory lock-in to the existing spatial arrangements of the electricity
market” as a barrier to success in developing renewable energy market).
144
THOMAS MORE HOBAN & RICHARD OLIVER BROOKS, GREEN JUSTICE: THE ENVIRONMENT
AND THE COURTS 5-6 (1996) (“Even its most ardent supporters have come to acknowledge
that whatever else the Superfund may be accomplishing, it is blotting up immense amounts
of money with frustratingly little to show for it.”)
145
Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PUB. CHOICE
49, 53-61 (1998) (illustrating flexibility and adaptability of common law).
146
Taleb, supra note 141, at 10.
147
Id. at 381.
148
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, SKIN IN THE GAME: HIDDEN ASYMMETRIES IN EVERYDAY LIFE
13 (2018) (“government interference in general tends to remove skin in the game”).
142
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antifragile. As he more colorfully puts it: “make sure there is also a
copilot” on any plane you board.149 Redundancy can come from making
options available, which broadening the narrative can help reveal.
Antifragility may also be enhanced by designing regulations so they are
outcome oriented as opposed to being technology specific. Instead of
instructing resource users as to how they must design, build and operate
their facilities, which then raises the risk of systemic failure or fragility, the
use of outcome or performance standards focuses on the required outcome
and penalties or rewards related to such.150 Parties are then set free to
experiment, yielding multiple solutions and limiting the prospect of
systemic failure. All along, of course, protection of the scarce resource can
be assured by way of penalties or rewards. This approach has been used in
controlling U.S. sulfur-dioxide emissions and in locating industrial
manufacturing plants in U.S. regions that have not attained national air
quality standards.151 In each case, a constraint to be achieved is set and the
emitter is free to discover and apply approaches for achieving the standard.
Failure to meet the constraint can result in penalties and loss of permits to
operate or produce and sell, as in the case of automobiles. Competitive
incentives to reduce the cost for improving environmental outcomes have
delivered large cost savings.
Problem 5: A resource owner seeks to use a resource (a
conservation or development use). A party alleging it is
affected by the decision seeks to require its interests to
be taken into account. Institutional solutions need to
avoid creating fragility.
F.

External Impacts: Resource Curses

There is some evidence to support the existence of a “resource
curse”—a penalty for states with large deposits of resources—although the
idea remains hotly contested.152 Resource-rich countries such as Angola,
149

Taleb, supra note 141, at 381.
That is, in the case of, say, pollution standards, parties would be free to determine how to
meet the standards rather than be bound by technological requirements set by regulators.
This would create incentives to create new technology and amend industry practices, rather
than be bound by technology known at the time a regulation was put in place.
151
See generally T.H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution
Policy, 62 Land Econ. 214, (1985) and Roger K. Raufer & Stephen L. Feldman, Acid Rain
and Emissions Trading: Implementing a Market Approach to Pollution Control (1987).
152
See generally Victor Menaldo, The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and
Development (2016) (The ‘resource curse’ is a view that countries with extensive natural
resources tend to be victims of a weakened state capacity, authoritarianism, scarcity of
150
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Congo, and Nigeria do poorly on many measures of development and
freedom; resource-poor jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, Japan, and South
Korea have done comparatively well.153 A variety of arguments are made
for the existence of the curse: (1) long term real declines in commodity
prices harm resource-dependent economies; (2) resource sectors crowd out
higher value added sectors; (3) commodity prices are volatile and volatility
harms economic growth; (4) governments are less willing to invest in
developing economies where they have secure revenue streams from
resources; (5) resource-rich jurisdictions are prone to armed civil conflict
over control of the resources; and (6) price swings for commodities
produce macroeconomic instability.154 Others argue that “natural resource
wealth does not need to be produced. It simply needs to be extracted (even
if there is often nothing simple about the extraction process)” and is
nonrenewable.155 This produces “[r]ampant opportunities for rent-seeking
by corporations and collusion with governmental officials.”156
It is certainly the case that resource-rich economies face different
challenges from resource-poor ones. Some resource-rich economies have
done well economically (e.g. Canada, Norway, the United States). As
Jeffrey Frankel notes, “[i]t is safe to say, that the destruction or
renunciation of resource endowments, to avoid dangers such as the
corruption of leaders, will not be” a policy to increase the odds of
prosperity.157 Frankel’s survey of the types of policies that promote
prosperity in resource-rich economies mostly identified ones that reduce
government officials’ discretion over resource management and investment
as well as index government spending and debt to commodity prices.158
The competing narratives here focus on different parts of the
government’s response to resource endowments. State-oriented narratives
public goods, war and economic stagnation. Menaldo argues that this is an ‘institutions
curse,’ arguing that natural resources have the potential to play a positive role in resource
rich countries).
153
Singapore, which is basically a hot-weather rock, has a Human Development Index of
0.938; Uganda, which is rich in natural resources, has an Index of 0.544. See United Nations
Development Programme, Human Development Reports (2018),
http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update. As the HIS site explains, the Index focuses on “the
richness of human life, rather than simply the richness of the economy.” Key measures are
standard of living, knowledge (years of schooling), and life expectancy.
154
See Jeffrey Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some
Prescriptions (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Fac. Res. Working Paper Series, RWP12-0144, 2012).
155
Macartan Humphries, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Introduction: What is the
Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?, in Escaping the Resource Curse 1, 4 (Macartan
Humphries, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2007).
156
Id. at 4.
157
See Frankel, supra note 125, at 35.
158
Id.
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place the blame for problems with the development of resources on
multinational businesses engaged in extraction and marketing. For
example, Humphries, Sachs, and Stiglitz are critical of how the United
States has handled resource sales, arguing that:
Even in democracies, when governments privatize natural
resources they often receive less than their full market value. Firms
in extractive industries care first and foremost about minimizing
what they have to pay for access to the resources. They therefore
seek to ensure that the deals are structured in a way the benefits
them over the government. Often, this is achieved through political
action such as campaign contributions and other forms of publicprivate alliances.159
That is, rather than deal with substantive problems, companies and nations
may prefer to transfer difficult resource decision-making beyond national
borders to transnational entities or NGO-driven supranational principles.160
For example, efforts to restrict multinationals from involvement with
“conflict minerals” in places like Congo center on changes to laws in
countries where the minerals are used, such as the United States, and on
trying to track the proceeds from the sale of conflict minerals.161
Property-oriented narratives, on the other hand, attribute failures in
resource-rich economies to non-resource institutional failures.162 In this
view, the problem in Congo is not that it has resources but that it lacks both
legal and physical infrastructure necessary for a non-extractive economy to
develop. It is no surprise that resource businesses “seek to ensure that the
deals are structured in a way the benefits them.” The puzzle is why the
governments do not hire good negotiators to seek contracts favorable to
them and identify the problem as that the officials seek personal benefits
rather than national welfare. The solution can be to focus on the growth
159

The irony of criticizing campaign contributions in a book whose forward is written by
George Soros appears to have escaped the authors. See Humphries, Sachs & Stiglitz, supra
note 155, at 14.
160
The National Democratic Initiative (NDI), chaired by former Secretary of State Madeline
Albright, offers better government proposals. See The National Democratic Initiative,
https://www.ndi.org/. In years past, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
was a prominent effort to get governments to bind themselves to honesty in resource
revenue use. Today EITI is barely mentioned on the NDI site likely because transparency
initiatives have not gone well. See Id.
161
Parker, Foltz & Elsea, supra note 44, at 736–738.
162
For an overview, see Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, Chapter 6
Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in 1 Handbook of Economic
Growth 385 (2005).
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that use of the resources will bring, rather than the one-time value of the
sale itself.163
Problem 6: Entrepreneurs and investors in a resource-rich
economy choose between investments in extractive industries
(and investments within those industries) and other
investments. Poor institutions bias choices toward rapid
exploitation of resources.
III.

PROPERTY RIGHTS SOLUTIONS TO RESOURCE PROBLEMS

Having outlined the broad classes of problems resource issues pose, we
now turn to the narratives that suggest potential market and property rights
solutions to each. As resource problems are as diverse in their individual
characteristics as any other economic problem, we sketch only broad
outlines of possible solutions, based on the experience in the American
West. In each case, we offer ideas about how to create a narrative to
promote market and property-rights solutions in the set of policies to be
considered.
A.

Incentivizing Knowledge

In principles of economics we learn that supply curves generally slope
up, which implies that to induce more of a behavior, we must increase the
rewards.164 This seems obvious but appears to be less so to those not fully
imbued in the economic model. The economic narrative is straightforward:
if we want individuals and organizations to devote more effort to creating
value from resources, from extraction, use value, or value from
conservation uses, we need increased rewards for developing that
knowledge. Even existence values ultimately depend on knowledge of the
value of the existence of a resource if they are to be translated into concrete
action.
The nineteenth century United States hit on a solution to this problem
for hard rock minerals: it gave title to the minerals and the surface estate to
anyone who located a resource and made minimal development efforts. In
prior work, two of us explored how this arose from the combination of the
163

See generally Morriss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra note 58 (Arguing that Mining Law
offers an important model for governments looking for the means to privatize public
property thus serving as a model for privatization of such resources).
164
The COVID episode generated discussion of providing large financial incentives for
firms to supply vaccines.
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earlier experience of American policymakers with lead deposits and the
European norm of state-ownership as well as some politics regarding
popular sovereignty.165 Whether a clever or accidental solution, the General
Mining Law of 1872 effectively solved the knowledge incentivization
problem for locating mineral deposits.166 We argue it later also solved the
problem of developing environmental-amenity-based resources, with land
claimants using the existence of mineral deposits to claim surface estates
with potential for recreation.167
However, “finders keepers” proved less satisfactory as a solution for
mobile mineral resources, such as oil and gas. The law then developed
modified property claims to take into account efficiency in exploitation by
pooling and unitization under the supervision of state regulators.168
Water falls in between the two end points. In the arid west, it was
initially allocated by a first-in-time method, but soon fell under state
control.169 One of us previously argued that this was driven by the desire of
special interests to avoid the general legal system’s reliance on juries,
where those interests were less successfully pursued than they were in state
and territorial capitals.170 Whatever the motive, water law became more
bureaucratic and codified over time, restricting the ability of entrepreneurs
who invented ways to deploy water to promote environmental amenities.171
Once those obstacles were removed, water markets showed increased
entrepreneurial activity.172 In all three cases, relatively simple legal
frameworks were sufficient to allocate rights to incentivize the

165

See generally Morriss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra note 58; Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E.
Meiners & Andrew Dorchak, Hard Rock Homesteads: Free Access and the General Mining
Law of 1872, 24 J. Energy & Nat. Res. L. 255, (2006) [hereinafter Hard Rock]; Andrew P.
Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Mining Landscape: Bootleggers, Baptists, and the
Promised Land, in Accounting for Mother Nature: Changing Demands for Her Bounty
(Anderson, Huggins & Power eds., 2007).
166
Id. at 257-59.
167
Id. at 269.
168
See generally Steven N. Wiggins & Gary D. Libecap, Oil Field Unitization: Contractual
Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 368 (1985) (Using
quantitative and empirical data to argue that the principal causes of contractual failure are
imperfect and asymmetric information that prevent agreement on lease values and hold-out
strategies of firms to increase their share of unit rents).
169
Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law for Emerging
Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 Oregon L. R. 861, 862–864 (2002).
170
Id. at 888.
171
Id. at 935.
172
Id. at 939; see also Terry L. Anderson & Pamela Snyder, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE
INVISIBLE PUMP 105 (1997).
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development of knowledge. Investment into more complex property rights
came as resource interests developed.173
Anti-developers, such as former Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt,
brilliantly undercut the knowledge creation narrative in the General Mining
Law, by terming it a “giveaway” and using giant “checks” that represented
alleged lost government revenue from awarding mineral rights to those
who located them.174 Developing support for solutions that increase
knowledge about resources must focus on the need to incentivize
knowledge creation. Whether involving mineral or other resources, the goal
should be to shift discussion to entrepreneurs who create new ways of
approaching environmental amenities and prospectors who invest resources
in locating resources. Works such as Terry Anderson and Donald Leal’s
Enviro-Capitalists recount case studies of how such solutions evolved and
operate.175 If solutions to resource problems are to incorporate incentives to
produce knowledge, those seeking solutions need to develop ways to tell
the stories of knowledge creation rather than allowing the narrative to be
framed as a “giveaway” of known resources. Shifting economic arguments
to focus on knowledge creation incentives is not simple. These are different
narratives than have traditionally been economists’ favorites; these are not
tales of partial equilibrium analyses or optimal tax/subsidy calculation. In
many respects, these draw on economic traditions outside the mainstream,
such as the Austrian tradition.176
Solution 1: Awarding property rights to the party that
develops the knowledge that identifies a resource
incentivizes increases in such knowledge.
Narrative 1: Focus on links between investment that produces
knowledge and rewards.
B.

Rights Recognition: Tradeoffs Among Conflicting Uses

173

Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice
among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 123, 139-141
(2001).
174
John H. Cushman, Jr., Forced, U.S. Sells Gold for Trifle, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1994, at
A12.
175
See Anderson & Leal, supra note 111 (Recounting the story of Tom Bourland, who
believes thar the growing demand for wildlife and recreation provides landowners with
powerful incentives to produce more wildlife habitat and more recognitional opportunities).
176
See, e.g., Ferry Stocker, Can Austrian Economics Provide a New Approach to
Environmental Policy?, in Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy 91-103 (Carlo
Carraro & Francois Leveque, eds., 1999).
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When faced with deciding how to use a particular piece of land,
property owners bear many of the costs of their choices. If a farmer plants a
subdivision instead of an orchard, she forgoes the opportunity to farm in
order to gain revenue from the subdivision. If she continues her orchard
and rejects a developer’s offer, she forgoes money she could have reaped
from the developer and keeps the opportunity to farm.177 Importantly,
decisions about assets have incentive effects even if the owner does not
care about a particular characteristic of the property in the future, so long as
others do.178 This insight enables us to point to Coasian bargaining as a
potential solution to many resource problems.179
There are successful examples of just such bargaining. If a farm
regularly visited by migratory waterfowl is worth more to some potential
buyers because of the birds’ presence, even a current owner who does not
care whether he can see flocks of birds landing on the property will suffer a
loss in value if he does not manage the property to encourage the birds.
However, the preferences of people who aren’t interested in buying the
property will have little impact unless alternative mechanisms can be
created to allow them to express those preferences. Ducks Unlimited’s
“Prairie Pothole” program provides such a mechanism. The organization
raises funds from hunters who want migratory bird populations to grow.
Ducks Unlimited pays farmers to remove marginally productive wetlands
on their properties from cultivation, and leave potholes in place rather than
fill them in, creating places for birds to rest while migrating.180
Proponents of state-centered narratives have several objections to such
ideas. First, they argue that property owners may not ‘correctly’ value their

177

In his book COST AND CHOICE (1969), Nobel laureate James M. Buchanan argues that
cost is the subjectively experienced consequence of cost—a consequence that often cannot
be observed or objectively measured by third parties. Our focus on explicit market prices,
which are only revealed when transactions occur, cause us often to focus, improperly, only
on measured accounting costs.
178
David R. Henderson, Opportunity Cost, THE LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY,
available at https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OpportunityCost.html.
179
See generally Terry L. Anderson, Donning Coase-coloured glasses: a property rights
view of natural resource economics, 48 AUSTRALIAN J. AG. & RES. ECON. 445 (2004)
(Arguing that by focusing on the transaction costs associated with the use of environmental
assets economists can begin to make the environment more of an asset and less of a liability)
180
See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENV’T L. 1, 59-60
(1999) (describing the role of private conservation efforts in protecting wetlands for
migratory birds and the use of small payments). For a recent overview, see Henry Holmes,
Protecting America’s Duck Factory: Lessons from Ducks Unlimited, 38 PERC REPORTS 2
(Winter 2019), https://www.perc.org/2019/12/06/protecting-americas-duck-factory/
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properties because they do not consider a factor that is relevant to others.181
Second, property owners have idiosyncratic tastes and may have a strong
preference for one outcome over another even if that preference is
“irrational” from an accounting (or other preferred) perspective.182
Subjective preferences account for decisions that to an outsider may be
hard to understand.
An even stronger objection is that the property owner will not properly
value impacts their decisions have on others and will thus have insufficient
incentive to bargain with them absent a state mandate to do so or state
action representing the public interest.183 Where property rights solutions
often do not satisfy those who are skeptical, conflicts arise from the
apparent lack of a mechanism to adjust for claims by people whose
interests are not represented by either the would-be buyer or the potential
seller. If a plot of land is valuable for its environmental function, such as a
wetland that filters runoff, neither the farmer nor the real estate developer is
incentivized to consider the city dweller’s valuation of the environmental
function. Asserting existence value is quite different from acting upon it—
having skin in the game—by putting money on the table.184 In a very
similar way, saltwater marshlands that are aquatic life-forming resources
for a vast range of species may be largely undervalued by the general
public and, because of a lack of transferable property rights, difficult for
commercial fishers to purchase and manage. But conservation
organizations can meaningfully address this problem by lobbying for and
gaining specific environmental easements and development rights that limit
marshland destruction. When successful in doing this, the conservation
organization has skin in the game and therefore bears a recognizable
opportunity cost for conserving specific tracts of marshland.
181

See Bryan Caplan, Externalities, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Externalities.html (defining externality argument).
182
Many, and even most, economists would not find it a problem to defer to the property
owner’s subjective valuation of the property. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected
Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 107-109 (2006) (discussing
subjective value).
183
Property expert John Sprankling makes a particularly robust case for a radical reshaping
of property law generally to correct for environmental problems. See generally John G.
Sprankling, Property Law for the Anthropocene Era, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 737 (2017) (Arguing
that property law will evolve from the rigid and absolutist approach prevalent in current
American property rights today, toward a more flexible and less categorical system of
property rights by utilizing the modified Takings Clause jurisprudence to guide the
evolution).
184
See generally Donald J. Boudreaux, Roger E. Meiners, & Todd J. Zywicki, Talk is
Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENV’T L. 765 (1999) (discussing existence value
claims–Value measurements are unavoidably spurious. The authors argue that even though
existence values are real, attempts to protect them are legally misguided).
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Property law does not generally provide for a stranger to a piece of
land to assert rights over the land.185 For some proponents of property
solutions, that is often a sufficient reason to say “tough luck,” a response
unlikely to sway someone to switch narratives.186 A second response, one
we have often resorted to, is that the alternative of state institutions is
unattractive due to the wide variety of problems grouped together under
public choice theory.187 Again, however, this does not seem to persuade
skeptics to switch narratives.188 In both instances, the counter-narrative is
firmly embedded that private actors are greedy and focused on short-term
gains, while government actors—no matter how many times problems with
government actors are demonstrated—are benevolent, long-term oriented,
thoughtful social planners.189 Even technical environmental economists
185

The debate over standing to assert environmental harms goes back to the beginning of
the modern environmental law era. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972) (Arguing that the
environment should be granted legal rights); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 154 (1985).
186
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 578
(1996) (“Because of the nature of environmental problems, however, the relevant property
rights are often poorly defined, and the transaction costs of negotiating their sale and
purchase are frequently high. Both circumstances entail market failures and a concomitant
need for environmental regulation.”).
187
James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: THE LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL Democracy (1962) (foundational work on topic). The
analysis is applied widely. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its
Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 379 (2009) (applying it to
climate change).
188
Jonathan B. Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87
GEO. L. J. 749, 749 (1999) (“Although public choice theory has explained much of
economic regulation as the product of concentrated group politics, the theory has not
furnished a convincing account of environmental regulation.”).
189
The environmental area is dominated by governmental controls yet many observers
believe more controls are needed. See e.g., James P. Morris, Who Controls the Waters?
Incorporating Environmental and Social Values in Water Resource Planning, 6 HASTINGS
W.-N.W. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 117, 117 (2000) (“Planning for the use and control of water is
planning for the most basic functions of the life of the Nation.”); Don C. Smith, The
European Union’s Commitment to Sustainable Development, 13 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. &
POL’Y 241, 256 (“The [European Community] shall have as its task, by establishing a
common market … to promote … a harmonious and balanced development of economic
activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment.”); William
L. Thomas, Rio’s Unfinished Business: American Enterprise and the Journey Toward
Environmentally Sustainable Globalization, 31 ELR 10873, 10882 (2002) (“The quest for
sustainability will involve other tools, including management systems that encompass
organizational structure, planning activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures,
processes, and resources for developing, implementing, achieving, reviewing, and
maintaining the company’s sustainable development or sustainability policy.”); Mitchell F.
Crusto, Green Business: Should We Revoke Corporate Charters for Environmental
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often follow the model of comparing market outcomes to the bliss points
achieved by an omnipotent social planner who implements solutions with
zero transactional costs.190
Changing the narrative thus requires a different story than “private
landowners good, bureaucrats bad” or “private landowners so-so,
bureaucrats worse.” One opportunity to do so comes from the narrative in
James Scott’s landmark Seeing Like a State.191 Scott, a professor of
political science and anthropology at Yale who describes himself as an
anarchist, examines how state actions shaped societies.192 One of his many
powerful examples is how nineteenth century Prussian forestry practices
changed the nature of forests. The government carefully counted only
valuable trees (and parts of trees), and so transformed Prussian forests from
diverse ecosystems into highly regimented monocultures because it
incentivized care only of the bits the government counted.193 Similarly, he
points to how the French window tax adopted under the Directory and not
repealed until 1971, reduced the number of windows in French houses.
Its originator must have reasoned that the number of windows and
doors in a dwelling was proportional to the dwelling’s size. Thus a
tax assessor need not enter the house or measure it but merely
count the doors and windows. As a simple, workable formula, it
Violations?, 63 LA. L. REV. 175, 190 (2002) (“[L]aw breaking corporations can be
dissolved, put out of business, their assets sold to others under a judge’s order that will
protect jobs, the environment, and the public interest.”).
190
The idea that social welfare can be enhanced by government decision makers dates back,
at least in part, to A.C. Pigou, a noted economist who held a chair at Cambridge early in the
last century. He explained that we should distinguish between social and private costs
because “[i]n general industrialists are interested, not in the social, but only in the private,
net product of their operations.” A.C. Pigou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172 (1920).
Hence, “market failure” would occur, thereby requiring legislative or regulatory action, as it
is “possible for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the divergence in any field [between
private and social costs especially by the use of] bounties and taxes” (Id. at 192). For an
extensive discussion, see Donald J. Boudreaux & Roger E. Meiners, Externality: Origins
and Classifications, 59 NAT. RES. J. 1 (2019). Those favoring state control over market
solutions focus on Pigouvian analyses. Jeanne M. Dennis, Comment, Smoke for Sale:
Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions Trading Program of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1111 (1993) (“Generally, environmentalists
have adopted a Pigovian approach to the value of the environment while pro-growth forces
have adopted a Coasean approach….”).
191
James C. Scott, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1998).
192
James C. Scott, TWO CHEERS FOR ANARCHISM (2012) (Distinguishing his approach from
the Hayekian model). Scott, SEEING LIKE A STATE, supra note 191, at 8. Nonetheless, his
work has been embraced by a number of market advocates. See, e.g., Tom Palmer, Life on
the Edge, REASON (June 2010) (reviewing Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed).
193
Scott, SEEING LIKE A STATE, supra note 191, at 14-19.
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was a brilliant stroke, but it was not without consequences. Peasant
dwellings were subsequently designed or renovated with the
formula in mind so as to have as few openings as possible. While
the fiscal losses could be recouped by raising the tax per opening,
the long-term effects on the health of the rural population lasted for
more than a century.194
More generally, Scott’s primary narrative illustrates the lengths that the
Southeast Asian hill peoples he studied went to avoid incorporation into
states whose rulers wished to tax and conscript them.195 Although Scott’s
story is not one of overburdened entrepreneurs heading for the hills to
escape regulators, his approach includes a critical point that needs
consideration in modern regulatory discussions: states choose rules based
on what is best for the state, not based on what is best for “the people” or
“society.”196 If citing Scott rather than Buchanan and Tullock and framing
the discussion in terms of “seeing like a state” rather than “public choice”
advances the consideration of this point, then this is a better avenue for
persuasion for proponents of market-oriented solutions.197 Because the
adoption of a rule—by identifying what is important—changes the
underlying society, we need to think carefully about the impact of
regulations on society as part of analyzing how to regulate. Shifting the
discussion to detailed accounts of how private rights holders and
government employees both behave, moves the narrative to terrain at least
open to market and property rights solutions. Doing so is not simple.
Scott’s book is based on deep knowledge of the societies he studies. We
need equivalent efforts to develop anthropological accounts of how
regulations work if we are to realistically and convincingly make
arguments about how states “see” resource problems.

194

Id. at 47-48.
See Scott, TWO CHEERS FOR ANARCHISM, supra note 192 (Examining social and political
interactions through the lens of Anarchism in order to understand the full spectrum of the
human condition).
196
Scott, SEEING LIKE A STATE, supra note 191, at n. 106.
197
The point of pubic choice analysis pioneered by Buchanan and Tullock, supra note 187,
which can be explained as politics without romance, is that actors in the political sector are
presumed to maximize self-interests, just like actors in the for-profit sector. Rhetoric aside,
we should not expect political actors to divine optimal solutions to problems because they
respond to political market forces dominated by a host of special interests. These things are
not bad, just a reflection of the reality of what is required to be successful in politics. Even
in times of extreme national emergencies, “petty” politics dominates, as discussed in detail
in Maury Klein, A Call to Arms; Mobilizing America in World War II (2013).
195
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Solution 2: Focus on detailed accounts of alternative
institutional regimes and incentives, not broad
sweeping claims.
Narrative 2: Comparing institutions based on deep
analysis of the incentives created by actual rules, not
hypothetical claims.
C.

Rights Security: Funding Development and/or
Preservation

Development and preservation of resources are costly, in technology,
opportunity costs, and institutions. These investments are often invisible to
consumers, voters, and policy makers, yet are critical to making
development or preservation occur.198 Because these may be invisible
investments to those outside the transactions, there appears to be little
recognition of the circumstances necessary to induce the investments.199
The narrative thus focuses on events that occur after a resource is
developed. Energy companies are visible targets for consumer anger when
prices rise or shortages occur.200 Similarly, former Secretary of the Interior
198

See Anderson & Leal, supra note 111, at 3 (discussing need for “enviro-capitalists” who
“invent new products, attract venture capital, contract with resource owners, and market
their products.”).
199
Casual observers, or even participants, of actions in the private and public sector are
often profoundly ignorant of the details behind the structure of institutions and policies.
Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1076
(2003) (“But voters often lack the time and knowledge base needed to evaluate proposals on
their merits. Rationally ignorant voters need a simple heuristic that they can use when
evaluating uncertain empirical matters.”); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of
Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1293 (2004) (“[L]ow levels of voter
knowledge … are in large part a result of ‘rational ignorance’ caused by the insignificance
of any one vote to electoral outcomes.”). Attempts to deal with ignorance often fail. See,
e.g., John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 IOWA J. CORP. L.
739. 809 (2007) (“[T]he SEC’s approach to fund marketing … have paved the way for
industry marketing ploys calculated to exploit investor ignorance.”); Lynn A. Stout, Are
Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99
YALE L. J. 1235, 1257 (1990) (“Ignorance encourages greater divergence of investor
opinion, allowing not just optimism, but wild optimism.”).
200
This is true of real property in general. Ronald A. Cass, Property Rights Systems and the
Rule of Law, THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 239 (Enrico
Colombatto, ed., 2004) (“Because the owner cannot remove the property to another
jurisdiction, local regulators can—subject only to the limits of political possibility—impose
conditions up to the value of the improvement.”). Mining and oil extraction firms make
large investments literally in the ground that cannot be moved so are even more vulnerable
to exploitation.
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Bruce Babbitt’s “giveaway” charge about the General Mining Law played
on this post-discovery focus.
This is true even on the investment side. For example, there is often
less sophistication among resources investors than many market advocates
presume. For example, not only did the 1990s Bre-X gold mine fraud in
Indonesia continue for years, but the principals of the company were
named “Mining Engineers of the Year” by The Northern Miner—the
“geologists’ bible”201—while the fraud was underway.202 Because ex ante
investments are not part of the narrative, proponents of increased state
involvement have often focused attention on controlling investment in
resource development to add transparency to resource investments as a
means of controlling ex post problems.203 Unsurprisingly, they pay
relatively little attention to the opportunities for fraud or mal-investment on
the conservation side.204 They also ignore the unknown opportunities
foregone by dedicating valuable resources to preservation.
Changing the narrative to be more open to market and property rights
solutions requires shifting away from portrayals of resource entities as
robber barons and a greater focus on the complexity of resource
development. Attention should be directed toward how many “dry holes”
are drilled by private parties on the way to the discovery of a gusher.
Recognition of the total amount invested to obtain a producing well or
mine can change attitudes regarding what otherwise appears to be
excessive revenues generated by gushers. Recognizing all costs incurred in
the development of resources also can bring different expectations of what
politically managed institutions might accomplish if given jurisdiction over
resource development. Taking a broader perspective brings a more nuanced
view of conservation investments, moving away from viewing them as
always beneficial and paying more attention to their total cost and
opportunities for fraud. The narratives markets and property rights
advocates must challenge are deeply embedded in popular culture.

201

Douglas Goold & Andrew Willis, THE BRE-X FRAUD 56 (1997).
Brian Hutchinson, FOOL’S GOLD 205-06 (1998). Lest we snicker at the rubes in mining,
remember that Bernie Madoff bamboozled many sophisticated investment professionals for
years. Just as Madoff produced audited financial documents that showed good returns, the
Bre-X fraud took place in a warehouse in Indonesia, using a top laboratory to test the salted
samples as a distraction. People like things that are too good to be true.
203
See, e.g., The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, available at https://eiti.org/
(promoting a “global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources.”).
See also Andreanna M. Truelove, Oil, Diamonds, and Sunlight: Fostering Human Rights
Through Transparency in Revenues from Natural Resources, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 207 (2003).
204
See, e.g., Dana Joel Gattuso, Conservation Easements: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
NATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS (May 2008), http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA569.html.
202
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Through pension funds and other vehicles many Americans are
invested in resource and conservation vehicles,205 although few appreciate
the scale of the investments needed to deliver products, energy, or services.
Similarly, despite the widespread growth of conservation investments, from
water resource funds to conservation easements, few appreciate the costs
incurred to structure these. Neither of these facts are likely to change in the
short term. Shifting the narrative likely requires something that operates at
a deeper level.
Economist Deirdre McCloskey argues that the Industrial Revolution, or
what she calls “the Great Enrichment,” was the result of changes in culture,
which are revealed in words. “Free innovation led by the bourgeoisie
became at last respectable in people’s words.”206 This shift in rhetoric
constituted a revolution in how people viewed themselves and how they
viewed the middle class, “the Bourgeois Revaluation. People have become
tolerant of markets and innovation.”207 Combined with the freedom to
innovate, dramatic innovations occurred. Recapturing that rhetoric for
innovators in both property development and conservation is a necessary
step to create space for innovation today as well. It requires recasting the
story of development around enabling investment through secure rights.208
This is unfamiliar terrain for economists. It requires a focus on
entrepreneurs working on resource problems and diving deeply into the
challenges they face and overcome (or fail to overcome). Revisiting Joseph
Schumpeter’s deeply detailed analyses of economic development provides
one such lens through which to develop such narratives, but Schumpeter’s
prose is dense and difficult.209
205

There is growing attention to strategic investing based on personal values, but the total is
relatively small. Nicolas Pascal, et al., Impact Investment in Marine Conservation, 28 DUKE
ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 199, 199 (2018) (“Impact Investors have invested over US $8 billion
since 2004 in food and agriculture, forestry, habitat protection, clean water initiatives, and
other conservation projects.”).
206
Deirdre N. McCloskey, BOURGEOIS DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS CAN’T EXPLAIN THE
MODERN WORLD 386 (2010).
207
Id. at 390.
208
This is challenging, as Hernando de Soto noted in The Mystery of Capital – the role of
incorporating property rights in the formal legal system in development is not understood
even by experts. de Soto, supra note 118, at 105 (“All the experts I queried, all the
professionals associated with the myriad property-related institutions and agencies I visited
admitted they had never thought about the question.”).
209
Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Creative Response in Economic History, ESSAYS ON
ENTREPRENEURS, INNOVATIONS, BUSINESS CYCLES, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM 223
(Richard V. Clemence, ed., 2008 [1947]). See also Joseph A. Schumpeter, Economic Theory
and Entrepreneurial History, ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENEURS, INNOVATIONS, BUSINESS CYCLES,
AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM 259 (Richard V. Clemence, ed., 2008 [1949])
(“entrepreneurship, as defined, essentially consists in doing things that are not generally
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Solution 3: Invest in institutions that reduce
transactions costs to lower the costs of developing and
preserving resources.
Narrative 3: Focus on narratives that showcase the
challenges and successes in overcoming those
challenges in developing resources and finding new
ways to conserve them.
D.

Providing Effective Public Institutions: Corruption

Most people—including us—have little idea where the materials for
most products we use come from or how they work. We thus have little
sense of the cost of finding and producing the materials that make an
iPhone, Tesla, Google Maps, or even a humble ball-point pen, work.210
Often we do not like what we see when we look: a Financial Times column
complained that “[b]ehind every clean electric car there is cobalt. And
behind cobalt is the Democratic Republic of Congo,” then pointing out the
human rights abuses and corruption rampant there.211
Corrupt autocrats with control of valuable resources appear remarkably
resistant to pressure from outsiders.212 This is not too surprising given the
scale of the rewards of corruption when there are valuable resources
available to allocate—and there is significant demand for resources. Efforts
to control corruption have focused on blocking accumulation and spending
done in the ordinary course of business routine” and so comes under “the wider aspect of
leadership”).
210
For an overview, see Nick Allum et al., Science Knowledge and Attitudes Across
Cultures: A Meta-Analysis, 17 PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE 1 (2008). Surveys find
the public at odds with scientific consensus. See Brian Kennedy and Cary Funk, Many
Americans are skeptical about scientific research on climate and GM foods, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/05/many-americansare-skeptical-about-scientific-research-on-climate-and-gm-foods/. A disconnect in
agriculture led Matt Ridley to forecast a shift in tastes against animal-based foods. Matt
Ridley, One day we will see that meat is murder, THE TIMES (London, April 24, 2017).
211
David Pilling, Clean electric cars are built on pollution in Congo, FINANCIAL TIMES
(July 26, 2017).
212
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Silverson, & James D. Morrow,
THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL 94-95 (2005) (When states are rich in natural resources
such as oil, leaders do not have to rely on the economic activity of residents to provide the
resources they need to reward their supporters as much as when such resources are absent.
Without the need to hold in check their desire to expropriate income, leaders dependent on
small winning coalitions can attempt to seize all of the pie. This has disastrous economic
and social consequences, as witnessed by the experience in Nigeria and elsewhere. …”)
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outside the allegedly corrupt jurisdictions themselves via pressure on
multinational resource firms and financial institutions.213 The narrative that
justifies these measures focuses on the complicity of firms sensitive to both
regulation and reputation, posing the choice as between virtuous public
investment and corruption. Absent from the discourse is the failure of state
institutions in the corrupt jurisdictions as well as the absence of property
rights for resources in those jurisdictions. It may be that Swiss bankers look
the other way when Congolese government officials open large accounts
for family members,214 but those payments would never occur without the
failings of the Congolese state that allow a clique to reap the benefits of the
resource wealth of the country.215 Advocates for property rights solutions
are less vocal about corruption than those suggesting state control as a
solution. If the narrative is going to shift, market and property rights
advocates must confront corruption issues directly and focus attention on
the institutional causes of corruption within jurisdictions, not just on the
proceeds of corruption.
The narrative cannot be solely built around narratives of corruption, for
it must disrupt the baseline of a competent state to create a debate with a
realistic appraisal of the capacity of governments to cope with the
challenges presented by resources. Good governance is a public good. It is
difficult to create and provide and is resource intensive. As Paul Rubin
noted in his assessment of how to reform post-Communist legal systems,
focusing scarce resources on the most pressing problems is critical.216
Because resources are so valuable—whether cobalt or Mineral King—
political allocation creates opportunities for corruption that must be
addressed on both the demand and supply sides. Here economists have an
213

Parker & Vadheim, supra note 44, at 2.
Illegal cash flows out of African countries may be $50 billion a year. Economic
Commission for Africa, High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, UNITED NATIONS
(2018), https://www.uneca.org/iff. See also Peter Fabricius, Swiss Bankers swear they are
trying to help Africa get its dirty money back QUARTZ (Jun. 13, 2016),
https://qz.com/africa/705509/swiss-bankers-swear-they-are-trying-to-help-africa-get-itsdirty-money-back/.
215
The Republic of Congo is ranked 165th most corrupt in the world, Transparency
International, (last visited Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/republic-of-the-congo, while the Democratic
Republic of Congo is ranked 170th most corrupt in the world. Transparency International,
https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo (last visited
Apr. 19, 2021); The popular press notes the depth of the problem. Yomi Kazeem, Two
investigations into corruption in resource-rich DR Congo shows why it stays so poor,
QUARTZ (Jul. 26, 2017), https://qz.com/africa/1038143/two-investigations-into-corruptionin-resource-rich-dr-congo-show-why-it-stays-so-poor/.
216
Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 CORNELL
INT’L. L. J. 1, 10-11 (1994).
214
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array of tools to contribute to the debate. The economics literature is filled
with articles examining alternative ways to allocate valuable resources,
from designing auctions to writing contracts.217 Finding transparent means
of resource allocation, combined with initiatives such as mineral royalty
funds to help reduce the opportunities for corruption in distribution of the
rewards, could be a useful contribution. Providing statistical studies that
demonstrate the existence of corruption—as with the Ziobrowski, et al.,
study on insider trading in the U.S. Congress218—can, at least, help identify
areas for reform. Most importantly, by clarifying the pressure point as the
allocation of valuable resources, economics can help shift the narrative
towards finding a solution.
Solution 4: Focus attention on corrupt jurisdictions and
tie corruption in resources to the lack of protection for
personal rights, including property rights.
Narrative 4: Instead of a focus on how much a
particular autocrat deposits in his foreign bank account
or the property the autocrat’s family buys externally,
develop accounts of how creating discretionary
authority within weak states facilitates corruption.
E.

Conflict Resolution: Interference with Others’ Rights

As noted earlier, part of the debate over rights’ interference are
disputes over whose rights get counted. Here, the state-oriented solutions
seem to have a clear advantage: they offer everyone (or, at least, those in
the majority) a chance to have their “rights” counted in resource decisions
involving other people’s property. Of course, having a voice heard when
political approaches are taken in the management of resources does not
preclude wayward outcomes from developing when the fine print of
resulting regulations are written. Special interest demand for politicallydetermined benefits generally influences the fine print while those who
hoped to place resource development on what they see as a higher plane
may unwittingly celebrate the outcome. Even so, exercising political rights
217

See, e.g., Elizabeth Wall & Remi Pelon, Sharing Mining Benefits in Developing
Countries: The Experience with Foundations, Trusts and Funds, (World Bank Working
Paper, Executive Industries for Development Series No. 62498, 2011).
218
Alan J. Ziobrowski, Ping Cheng, James W. Boyd, & Brigitte J. Ziobrowski, Abnormal
Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate, 39 J. FINANCIAL & QUANT.
ANAL. 661, 662 (2004) (“the behavior of common stocks purchased and sold by Senators
indicates that Senators trade with a substantial informational advantage.”).
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comes at low or no direct cost, as the state stands in for them. The
challenge for proponents of property rights solutions is to persuade the
public and policymakers who respond to voters that inclusion of additional
rights holders is not the costless decision it appears to be. Regardless of
whose interests are ultimately recognized as rights, and so “counted,”
resource use decisions will inevitably involve the just-described fine-print
problem as well as conflicts over these rights. This requires a decisionmaking process, including a way to use the resolution to further develop
relevant rules.
How best to develop a framework of rules fair to all concerned to
decide disputes in a cost-effective manner, particularly with respect to
assets that are fixed in location and valuable (e.g. spots of great natural
beauty, mineral deposits)? The state-centric solution has been to put a
government agency in charge. The problems with that—from Nevada
Territory to the Congo today—are evident, but property rights solutions
have tended to fall back on wishful thinking (“the World Bank will help”)
or into the “assume a can opener” model.219 Fortunately, there are some
insights. Simple, general rules avoid many problems;220 gradual
development of legal frameworks are helpful;221 and jurisdictional
competition can promote quality rules and processes.222 These ideas are not
routinely part of standard narratives.
Changing the narrative requires two complementary strategies. First,
there needs to be a conversation about the advantages market and property
rights solutions have in resolving these issues and the conditions necessary
to make them work. The core problem for these narratives is that nobody
“wins” 100 percent of the disputes. (Of course, no one “wins” all of the
political disputes over resource allocation either, but that gets talked about
less and losses are generally attributed to the malign influence of money or
despicable opponents and so require redoubled efforts rather than a
219

A reference to a classic economist joke:
A physicist, an engineer and an economist are stranded in the desert. They are
hungry. Suddenly, they find a can of corn. They want to open it, but how?
The physicist says: “Let’s start a fire and place the can inside the flames. It will
explode and then we will all be able to eat”.
“Are you crazy?” says the engineer. “All the corn will burn and scatter, and we’ll
have nothing. We should use a metal wire, attach it to a base, push it and crack the
can open.”
“Both of you are wrong!” states the economist. “Where the hell do we find a metal
wire in the desert?! The solution is simple: ASSUME we have a can opener”…
Oleg Komlik, The Joke Goes Like This, Econ. Socio. & Pol. Econ. Blog, (Dec. 27, 2014),
https://tinyurl.com/y84ypkcq
220
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
221
Rubin, supra note 216.
222
See Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, THE LAW MARKET (2009).
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different approach.) Property rights solutions handle disputed terrain better
than political solutions precisely because they are good at finding
compromises, but compromises are messy and unattractive. While
economists have been good at describing the abstract virtues of market and
property rights solutions, they have done less well at developing narratives
that focus on how those institutions help resolve disputes.223 Economists
often treat institutions, including businesses, as black boxes that magically
produce certain results.
Second, there needs to be a shift away from the idea that leaving
property rights owners alone to make decisions misses important social
costs. Economics textbooks often reinforce the mistaken idea that there is
an externality under every rock, just waiting for the benevolent, all-seeing
social planner to step in to resolve the problem with the optimal subsidy or
tax or cap.224 That works well in a partial equilibrium analysis in a textbook
but works less well in the real world of political economy. Social costs are
notoriously hard to define, as the debate over the social cost of something
as important as carbon illustrates.225 Merely pointing this out is not enough.
223

In his working paper, Robert J. Shiller observes that “economics has lagged behind most
other disciplines in attending to the importance of narratives.” Shiller, supra note 2, at 12.
And that “most economists appear [not] interested in using the enormous databases of
written words that they might work with to study narratives.” Shiller, supra note 2, at 13).
224
See Boudreaux & Meiners, supra note 190. Almost every economics textbook discusses
externalities, even at the principles level. A text by leading economists at Chicago, Harvard
and MIT is standard: “An externality occurs when there is a spillover from one person’s
actions to a bystander. … In this chapter, we will see that in the case of externalities,
governments can enact policies to push market outcomes toward a greater level of social
wellbeing.” Daron Acemoglu, et al., MICROECONOMICS 199 (2015).
225
Estimates of the social costs of carbon vary widely. See Michael Greenstone, Testimony
to House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Subcommittee on Environment,
Subcommittee on Oversight (Feb. 28, 2017). Some argue, mistakenly in our view, that any
“reasonable” positive price of carbon would be an improvement over an implicit price of $0
set by a failure to regulate. Ever since Lipsey and Lancaster’s classic article on second best
theory, the inability to predict a welfare improvement based on ‘fixing’ a single distortion in
a market has been both well-established and resolutely ignored by policymakers, academics,
and economists generally. The key insight is that some market imperfections offset others;
removing a single imperfection may move society closer to the socially optimal equilibrium
or may move it further away. See R.G. Lipsey and R.K. Lancaster, The General Theory of
Second Best, 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). Efforts to improve academic analysis have
been mostly unsuccessful. For example, Prof. Richard Markovits has diligently prodded the
economics profession to develop a theoretically coherent analytical framework for coping
with second best problems for many years. See Richard S. Markovits, The General Theory
of Second Best and Economic-Efficiency Analysis: The Theory, Its Negative Corollaries, the
Appropriate Response to It, and a Coda on the Economic Efficiency of Reducing Poverty
and Income/Wealth Inequality, 49 AKRON L. REV. 437 (2016). See also Andrew P. Morriss,
Implications of Second-Best Theory for Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case Study
of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135 (1998).
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What the narrative market and property rights advocates need is one that
uncovers how institutions can unlock creative solutions to such conflicts.
Designing water rights contracts that divert irrigation water to in-stream
flows during droughts while tapping insurance markets to compensate
farmers whose crops suffer is an example of one such solution.226 In the
arid West, this was sometimes accomplished by way of mutual irrigation
companies organized and owned by landowners who wished to provide
effective management of irrigation water.227 Giving recognition to the fact
that the creative development of green investment and credit market
investor portfolios that require environmentally sensitive changes in
corporate and government behavior enables occurrence of invisible markets
for environmental quality is another example.228
Solution 5: Focus on examples of creative, entrepreneurial
solutions rather than broad, theoretical claims about
incentives. Pay attention to failures of political institutions that
derail accomplishment of goals.
Narrative 5: Attempt to shift the discussion away from
“sky is falling” claims to focus on building antifragile
institutions that adapt to changing circumstances.
F.

External Impacts: Resource Curses

When economists and others cannot even agree if such a thing as a
resource curse exists, it may be premature to think about solving it.
However, the narrative of the resource curse is an important part of the
debate over the role of the state for three reasons. First, resource curse
stories cast governments as victims of forces beyond their control—they
are “cursed” with resources that somehow prevent them from doing

226

This market is actively evolving. For example, the firm WestWater has pioneered
innovative water contracts. See Westwater Research, www.waterexchange.com (last visited
Apr. 20, 2021). See also Tatyand Deryugina & Megan Konar, Impacts of Crop Insurance on
Water Withdrawals for Irrigation, 10 ADVANCES IN WATER RESOURCES 437 (2017)
(discussing the impact of insurance on water usage).
227
See Randy T. Simmons, Yandle, Coase, Pigou and Irrigation in the American West, The
Legacy of Bruce Yandle 108-112 (Donald J. Boudreaux & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2020).
228
See generally Bruce Yandle, Will Free Markets Rise to Meet the Environmental
Regulation Challenge? 44 REGULATION 8 (2020) (Arguing that climate change is seen as
the most serious long-term threat to our world which has caused sustainability-linked loans
to rapidly increase thus pushing the environmental movement towards a market driven
approach).
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creative things to stimulate growth.229 The story then becomes that
rapacious companies seek advantageous contracts.230 In so doing, these
narratives reduce accountability and deflect conversations from
comparative strengths and weaknesses of different institutions. Second,
resource curse narratives are premised on the notion that there is an ideal
path to development; the presence of the resources distorts a jurisdiction
from that path.231 If development is part of a discovery process in which
jurisdictions must find their competitive and comparative advantages, this
is a distraction.232 Third, while the resource curse literature focuses
attention on the impact on state institutions, it generally does not consider
the alternative of shifting resource decisions to private actors and the
benefits of doing so.233

229

See Jeffrey A. Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper 15836, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15836 (overview);
Tomas Havranek, Roman Horvath, & Ayaz Zeynalov, Natural Resources and Economic
Growth: A Meta-Analysis, 88 WORLD DEV. 134 (2016); Norman Loayza, Alfredo Mier y
Teran, & Jamele Rigolini, Poverty, Inequality, and the Local Natural Resource Curse,
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6366, 2013),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/783851468170967093/Poverty-inequality-andthe-local-natural-resource-curse (discussing how mining activity worsens inequality and
increases social discontent).
230
Henry Clark et al., Oil For Nothing: MultinationalCorporations, Environmental
Destruction, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta (2000),
https://www.essentialaction.org/shell/Final_Report.pdf (“The profit-driven col- lusion
between multinational oil companies and the past and present Nigerian governments has
cost many lives and continues to threaten the stability of the region.”). In many instances the
companies are governments operating through state-owned enterprises. China has been
especially aggressive in structuring deals that allow it to seize assets. See Maria Abi-Habib,
How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html.
231
Carlos A. Leite & Jens Weidman, Does Mother Nature Corrupt? 8-9 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 99/85, (1999),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Does-Mother-Nature-CorruptNatural-Resources-Corruption-and-Economic-Growth-3126.
232
Michael E. Porter, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 1 (1998) (“We must focus
on … why does a nation become the home base for successful international competitors in
an industry?”).
233
Proposed solutions to the resource curse frequently suggest the creation of alternative
government control mechanisms, such as marketing boards, higher taxes during boom times,
government stockpiles of commodities, and other strategies to limit the ill effects of existing
government control of resources. See Int’l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Policy Formulation and
Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, & Annalisa
Fedelino, eds., 2003); Jeffrey Sachs, How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth,
ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 172 (Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs, & Joseph
Stiglitz, eds., 2007).
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Changing the narrative here requires recovering one of de Soto’s
“missing lessons of U.S. history.”234 The United States underwent
spectacular commodity booms during the nineteenth century. Its
experiences with problems during the first round of booms involving lead
deposits informed its decision to avoid state claims on resources in the
second half of the nineteenth century.235 Where there were identifiable
resource curse-like impacts, they occurred in territorial governments where
institutions were weaker. When strong institutions were present, the
resource curse effects we observe today were largely absent. This is
consistent with political scientist Victor Menaldo’s analysis; he argues that
it is more appropriate to talk of an “institutions curse” than a “resource
curse”.236 Building strong, decentralized institutions is thus a powerful
means of addressing these problems. Compelling narratives can play a
strong role in attracting interest to non-traditional views.
Recovering the narrative of past success and focusing on institutions is
an opportunity to shift the discussion towards finding appropriate solutions,
an arena where we think property rights and markets can play a
constructive role. To make that shift, economists should move their
arguments away from the resource curse framework and focus on the,
admittedly harder, discussion of appropriate institutional design.
Developing detailed case studies of how institutions function is an
important step in beginning that discussion.237
One of the most compelling narratives arises from the degradation of
indigenous peoples in many nations. The history of Native Americans in
the United States is one of long abuse as people were slaughtered, driven
from their lands, and warehoused on lands generally considered to be
undesirable, called reservations. Many indigenous people are treated as if
they are colonial subjects. They do not enjoy the kinds of secure property
rights key to the development of wealth. Projects such as Renewing
Indigenous Economies bring together powerful narratives and practical
recommendations for developing conditions to allow these peoples to
234

de Soto, supra note 118, at 105.
Morriss et al., Homesteading Rock, supra note 58, at 259-60.
236
See Menaldo, supra note 152 (Arguing that natural resources, especially oil, are not a
cure and in fact assist in improving the quality of political and economic institutions, which
in turn, strengthen state, democracy and the rule of law).
237
People are creative at solving problems. In Bolivia, tree harvesting in Los Negros Valley
was destroying a watershed that downstream farmers relied upon. Natura Bolivia, headed by
Maria Theresa Vargas, stepped in to pay farmers to protect the trees by giving them
beehives. They used honey from the hives to pay upstream land users to not harvest trees.
The costs of the program are low and those involved on both sides of the issue benefit from
the resolution. Hannah Downey, Trading for Water in Bolivia, 34 PERC REPORTS 2 (2015),
https://www.perc.org/2015/11/24/trading-for-water-in-bolivia/.
235
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restore their dignity, culture, and make use of their resources as they see
best.238
Solution 6: ‘Solve’ the resource curse by shifting
resources away from states and toward private actors
and adopting mechanisms to smooth revenue flows to
states from resources.
Narrative 6: Abandon the “curse” narrative and focus
on building institutions capable of handling the wealth
flowing from resources.
CONCLUSION
We proposed six classes of resources problems for which market-andproperty-rights-based methods offer potential solutions as well as some
thoughts on ways to change the narrative to bring these into the discussion.
These are set out in the following table.
Problem

Solution

Narrative

An economic actor
(individual, firm)
1 invests resources to
locate a valuable
resource (place of
natural beauty,
critical habitat,
mineral deposit, etc.).
Without investment,
the resource would
not be discovered or
developed.

Awarding property
rights to the party that
develops the
knowledge that
identifies a resource
incentivizes increases
in such knowledge.

Focus on links
between investment
that produces
knowledge and
rewards.

The owner of a
resource has a choice
2 between two uses,
one of which
preserves more

Focus on detailed
accounts of
alternative
institutional regimes
and incentives, not

Comparing
institutions
based on
deep
analysis of

238

See Terry L. Anderson, Renewing Indigenous Economies,
https://www.policyed.org/indigenous-econ (last visited, Apr. 20, 2021).
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‘natural’ aspects of
the area containing
the resource than the
other. Others seek to
assert an interest in
the decision. Which
interests have a right
to a say in the
resolution?

broad sweeping
claims.

the
incentives
created by
actual rules,
not
hypothetical
claims.

A resource owner
decides between a
3 development or
conservation use that
requires capital to
accomplish. The
owner must account
for the constraints
imposed by the
funding mechanism.
For development,
investors must be
compensated for
risks; for
conservation,
investors must
receive monetary
and/or non-monetary
returns that can
impact the form of
the investment.

Invest in institutions
that reduce
transactions costs to
lower the costs of
developing and
preserving resources.

Focus on narratives
that showcase the
challenges and
successes in
overcoming those
challenges in
developing
resources and
finding new ways to
conserve them.

A resource owner
seeks to implement a
4 conservation or
development plan
that requires public
or private approvals
from a public or
private organization.
Securing the
approvals requires

Focus attention on
corrupt jurisdictions
and tie corruption in
resources to the lack
of protection for
personal rights,
including property
rights.

Instead of a focus
on how much a
particular autocrat
deposits in his
foreign bank
account or the
property the
autocrat’s family
buys externally,
develop accounts of
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action by a
bureaucracy. The
bureaucracy demands
favors in exchange
for granting the
approvals.

how creating
discretionary
authority within
weak states
facilitates
corruption.

A resource owner
seeks to use a
5 resource (a
conservation or
development use). A
party alleging it is
affected by the
decision seeks to
require its interests to
be taken into
account. Institutional
solutions need to
avoid creating
fragility.

Focus on examples of
creative,
entrepreneurial
solutions rather than
broad, theoretical
claims about
incentives. Pay
attention to failures of
political institutions
that derail
accomplishment of
goals.

Attempt to shift the
discussion away
from “sky is
falling” claims to
focus on building
antifragile
institutions that
adapt to changing
circumstances.

Entrepreneurs and
investors in a
6 resource-rich
economy choose
between investments
in extractive
industries (and
investments within
those industries) and
other investments.
Poor institutions bias
choices toward rapid
exploitation of
resources.

“Solve” the resource
curse by shifting
resources away from
states and toward
private actors and
adopting mechanisms
to smooth revenue
flows to states from
resources.

Abandon the
“curse” narrative
and focus on
building institutions
capable of handling
the wealth flowing
from resources.

These classifications do not resolve a debate that has been long running
about the benefits and weaknesses of alternative property regimes. They
point in the direction that advocates of market-based and property-rights
solutions need to move if we are to have more influence in the debates
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about natural resources and environmental issues. Prof. Epstein’s account
of the dramatic change in how whales are viewed and the consequences for
policy toward whaling illustrates the potential and the danger present here
for all sides. As Epstein demonstrates, the rhetorical shift in whaling
discourse dramatically changed the debate over whaling. Captain Ahab
characters went from heroic if tragic to villains; whales morphed from
frightening “sea cannibals” (portrayed as such as late as the 1950s) to
cuddly “sea pandas.”239 Epstein’s story is not a simple one of virtue
triumphant, however. Whaling discourse became a means of virtue
signaling, international regulation of whales a contested political terrain
that ignores important differences among whale species, and the narrative
is often dismissive of indigenous traditions built around whaling.240
Rather than replicating the evolution of whaling discourse, we advocate
more open dialogue. Sometimes markets and property rights solutions are
best. Sometimes they are not.241 The same is true of state-centric solutions.
What is necessary is a discourse with room for dialogue; thus far, the
market-and-property-rights side has failed in finding the right words. What
is to be done? Broadly speaking, we think there are three steps “our side”
can take to broaden the discussion to include the ideas we believe can help
address important problems concerning natural resources. Of course, these
steps will not make instant converts or lead to “dogs and cats living
together.”242 They might produce incremental progress, however.
o

Develop more well-researched historical and current case
studies that include real people solving real problems,
often imperfectly, through markets and property rights.243
Scott’s work should inspire economists to attempt similar
studies.

o

Use stories that convey the insights of theoretical and
empirical work to compliment the models and statistics. As

239

Epstein, supra note 4, at 89.
Id. at 212 (virtue signaling), Id. at 205-6 (population differences); Rupa Gupta,
Indigenous Peoples and the International Environmental Community: Accommodating
Claims Through a Cooperative Legal Process, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1741 (1999) (describing
conflict over indigenous claims to whaling rights).
241
We, and like-minded colleagues, have thought hard about a market solution to the
problem of greenhouse gasses and have come to the conclusion that if they should be
reduced it will be through government regulation and taxes. Economists can discuss the
merits of alternative government actions, but have not devised a pure market “solution.”
242
Ghostbusters (RCA/Columbia Pictures 1984). In our context, the incompatible pairing
might be deep ecologists and economists.
243
See Anderson, supra note 238 (exemplifying novel work in the area).
240
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McCloskey notes, economists are terrible at story telling.
Often academic legal writing (including our own) is little
better, which is ironic given that practicing lawyers are
often master storytellers. We should not stop the hard work
of developing theoretical and empirical insights, but we
have to communicate results in language outsiders can
understand.
o

Pay attention to culture. The late Andrew Breitbart’s
mantra that politics was downstream of culture is a pithier
version of a similar idea in the Italian Marxist Antonio
Gramsci’s work.244 If right and left agree culture is
important, it seems obvious that unless our ideas are part of
the cultural narrative, our ideas will not be part of the
solution.

Lou Cannon is a reporter who covered Ronald Reagan for over three
decades. Cannon said Reagan was “the first (and some would say only)
nationally popular conservative leader in American history,” who “had a
gift for narrative, and the famous stories he told to make his points with
audiences were also his way of explaining to himself how the world
worked.”245 In addition to Ronald Reagan’s story-telling abilities, he had
the ability to show respect for those who disagreed with him. He listened
well. Too often, we fear, those in the law and economics camp appear to be
so convinced that they have a pipeline to the divine that they are literally
unable to demonstrate graceful and honest consideration of a competing
narrative. As we see it, narrative competition is not a stock car race where
winners and losers will be defined by who crosses the finish line first.
Narrative competition is about ongoing conversations where, ultimately,
society determines the dominant story. This determination may appear in
novels, news coverage, or in political speeches. Narratives are more than
marketing, discourse more than wrapping paper around ideas. Ultimately,
however, the world is a practical place. Narratives that prevail must be
about policies that will work effectively and competitively. The lessons we
pass to our children are about things that enable a more prosperous life. We
think there is more to be gained from a broader conversation than from
talking to ourselves. We need to find better words.

244

See Andrew Breitbart, RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION: EXCUSE ME WHILE I SAVE THE WORLD
112 (2011).
245
Lou Cannon, GOVERNOR REAGAN: HIS RISE TO POWER 116-118 (2003).
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